










Every year, thousands of taxpayers and their advisors are required to mail 
special disclosure forms that reveal details of potentially abusive tax strategies to 
the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis of the Internal Revenue Service in Ogden, Utah.  
This mandatory disclosure regime has been widely praised as one of the govern-
ment’s most effective weapons in its war on tax shelters.  In contrast to this largely 
positive portrayal, however, this Article argues that the current tax shelter 
disclosure law is incomplete.  While the primary aim of current law is to deter 
nondisclosure of information by taxpayers and advisors, my claim is that the 
government should also strive to prevent behavior that may be just as problematic 
to the IRS’s ability to detect and challenge tax shelters—overdisclosure of information.  
As this Article demonstrates, since the introduction of the tax shelter reporting rules 
in 2000, taxpayers and advisors have frequently disclosed to the IRS their 
participation in routine, nonabusive transactions or details of activities that are 
irrelevant to tax shelter detection.  After investigating the sources of overdisclosure, 
I conclude that the tax law itself invites this response from distinct types of 
taxpayers and advisors.  Conservative types overdisclose out of excessive caution, 
while aggressive types overdisclose in an attempt to avoid detection of abusive tax 
planning.  As a result of the threats to tax administration posed by overdisclosure, I 
offer three novel proposals for proactively reducing its occurrence: the introduction 
of anticipatory angel lists when the IRS designates new listed transactions; the 
enactment of targeted overdisclosure penalties; and a non-tax documentation 
requirement for business taxpayers. 
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At the foot of the Wasatch Mountains about ten miles east of the Great 
Salt Lake, the Internal Revenue Service searches for tax shelters.  Inside its 
vast processing facility in Ogden, Utah, officials in the IRS Office of Tax 
Shelter Analysis sort through thousands of disclosure statements from taxpay-
ers and their lawyers, accountants, and other advisors that provide details of 
complex transactions that IRS officials suspect might be abusive.1  Because 
tax shelters at first may appear to comply with the literal text of the Internal 
Revenue Code and resemble real business deals, they often fail to raise red 
flags for the IRS on their own.2  In response to this detection obstacle, the tax 
law mandates that taxpayers and their advisors disclose to the IRS instances 
in which they participate in a myriad of transactions that bear tax shelter traits.3 
Commentators have praised the tax shelter reporting rules as a “powerful 
tax enforcement tool” that leads to “enhanced compliance.”4  Some former 
top government officials have even boldly declared that as a result of these rules, 
“the tax shelter war is over” and “[t]he government won.”5  When the mandatory 
disclosure regime works well, it provides the IRS with a valuable audit 
roadmap, enabling it to detect abusive tax planning that would otherwise 
remain hidden.  Mandatory disclosure can provide taxpayers and their advisors 
with early warnings of the tax positions that the IRS will challenge.  The 
reporting rules also chill the market for tax strategies that must be disclosed 
to the IRS.6 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Taxpayers are required to disclose the details of reportable transactions in which they 
participate by filing IRS Form 8886, Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement, with the IRS 
Office of Tax Shelter Analysis in Ogden, Utah.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (d) (as amended in 2007).  
Tax advisors that qualify as material advisors are required to file IRS Form 8918, which bears 
similar information.  Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3(d)(1) (2007). 
 2. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 
339, 363–68 (2005); Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong With Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7–10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365888) 
(discussing the rules/standards distinction in tax shelter context). 
 3. Taxpayers and their advisors are required to report their participation in arrangements 
the IRS has identified as listed transactions, those it considers potentially abusive, such as the Son 
of BOSS or Sale In/Lease Out arrangements.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2); see, e.g., Rev. Rul. 
2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 (Lease In/Lease Out transactions); I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 
255 (Son of BOSS transactions).  The rules also require taxpayers and their advisors to inform the 
IRS if they have pursued transactions possessing much more general features.  Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-
4(b)(3), (4). 
 4. Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289, 323 (2002). 
 5. Pamela Olson, Now That You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to Do With It?  
Observations From the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 60 TAX LAW. 
567, 567 (2006).  
 6. See infra notes 54–65 and accompanying text for discussion. 
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In contrast to this largely positive portrayal, this Article argues that the 
current tax shelter disclosure law is incomplete.  While the primary aim of cur-
rent law is to deter nondisclosure of information by taxpayers and advisors, my 
claim is that the government should also strive to prevent behavior that is just 
as problematic to the IRS’s ability to detect and challenge tax shelters—
overdisclosure of information.  As this Article demonstrates, since the intro-
duction of the tax shelter reporting rules in 2000, taxpayers and advisors have 
frequently disclosed to the IRS their participation in routine, nonabusive 
transactions or details of activities that are irrelevant to tax shelter detection.  
After investigating the sources of overdisclosure, I conclude that the tax law 
itself invites this response from distinct types of taxpayers and advisors.  
Conservative types overdisclose out of excessive caution, while aggressive types 
overdisclose in an attempt to avoid detection of abusive tax planning.  Other 
scholars have acknowledged the hypothetical potential for overdisclosure in 
response to the mandatory tax shelter disclosure regime,7 but none have 
thoroughly addressed why overdisclosure may occur or whether or how it may 
be avoided.  This Article thus provides the first rigorous investigation of the 
sources of overdisclosure in the context of tax shelter reporting and offers 
strategies, absent from current law, for preventing the overdisclosure response. 
The overdisclosure response poses serious threats to tax administration.  
When the IRS receives disclosure statements regarding complex transactions 
that lack tax avoidance motivation, its agents must investigate and distinguish 
these transactions from those that actually are abusive.  This distraction slows the 
IRS’s investigations of truly abusive transactions, delaying statutory responses to 
tax avoidance strategies.  Further, the substantial time that taxpayers and their 
advisors spend preparing and filing unnecessary disclosure statements represents 
wasteful behavior.8  
Overdisclosure is a natural reaction from conservative, cautious taxpay-
ers and advisors.  The categories of transactions that taxpayers and advisors 
must disclose are broad: The IRS requires disclosure not only of specifically 
described transactions,9 but also involvement in any arrangements that may 
result in “similar” tax consequences or involve “similar” fact patterns.10  The 
IRS has often been slow to explain how the tax shelter reporting rules should 
                                                                                                                            
 7. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 8. See LARGE & MID-SIZE BUS. SUBGROUP, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY 
COUNCIL, PUBLIC MEETING BRIEFING BOOK 11–12 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/2006_irsac_public_meeting.pdf (discussing overdisclosure problem); Dustin Stamper & Sheryl 
Stratton, Guidance Coming on New Shelter Rules, Says Treasury Official, 105 TAX NOTES 785, 785 (2004). 
 9. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (as amended in 2007) (requiring taxpayers to disclose 
listed transactions). 
 10. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4). 
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be applied in uncertain situations.  Because the penalties for failing to comply 
with the mandatory disclosure regime are severe, and apply on a strict liability 
basis,11 the breadth of current law causes conservative taxpayers and advisors 
to provide more rather than less information when in doubt.12 
For aggressive taxpayers and advisors—those that push the envelope by 
claiming the riskiest tax positions—overdisclosure provides an attractive 
strategy for avoiding IRS detection of abusive tax planning.  By reporting a 
multitude of nonabusive transactions along with their most questionable tax 
positions, aggressive taxpayers and advisors may believe that they will escape 
high penalties for nondisclosure without increasing the likelihood that the IRS 
will detect and challenge their abusive transactions.13  Further, aggressive 
taxpayers and advisors may be emboldened by the tax law’s explicit endorse-
ment of their behavior.14  Finally, after hearing frequent public statements by 
IRS officials that the Service has received too much information in response 
to some of its disclosure requests,15 aggressive types may seize on the overdis-
closure strategy as a way to avoid IRS detection. 
How can overdisclosure be overcome?  I propose three novel changes to 
the substantive tax law that could enable the government to address the 
overdisclosure response proactively. 
First, the IRS should revisit its approach to designating tax strategies as 
listed transactions, the types of tax strategies that the government considers 
to be most blatantly at odds with Congress’s intent.16  Under the current 
regime, tax strategies that the IRS does not intend to cover are noticeably 
absent from the IRS’s announcements of new listed transactions.17  In 
contrast, I propose that before designating a tax strategy as a listed transac-
tion, IRS officials should endeavor to compile a list of clearly nonabusive 
transactions that the most scrupulous conservative taxpayers and advisors 
might find substantially similar to it.  Under the proposal, when the IRS desig-
nates a strategy as a listed transaction, it would include in its announcement an 
                                                                                                                            
 11. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2) (B) (2006) (setting forth a fixed monetary penalty of 
$200,000 for corporations failing to disclose a listed transaction). 
 12. See Jeremiah Coder, Official Explains Changes in Final Transaction Reporting Regs, 116 
TAX NOTES 925, 925 (2007) (quoting a senior Treasury Department official as stating “taxpayers 
have erred on the side of caution by narrowly construing [‘substantially similar’]”). 
 13. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (discussing expected value analysis). 
 14. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4) (key reporting requirements must be “broadly construed 
in favor of disclosure.”). 
 15. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 16. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) for the definition of a listed transaction. 
 17. See infra notes 235–239 and accompanying text. 
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anticipatory angel list of some of these nonabusive transactions, exempting 
them from mandatory disclosure. 
Next, taxpayers and advisors that overdisclose should face targeted 
monetary penalties.  While current federal tax law contains high monetary 
and nonmonetary penalties for taxpayers and advisors that fail to file required 
disclosure statements, it contains no explicit penalties for those that, either 
out of caution or malice, file unnecessary statements.18  As opposed to the 
status quo, my proposal would impose a monetary penalty upon any taxpayer 
or advisor that discloses a transaction included on an angel list.  My proposal 
would however exempt from this penalty any taxpayer or advisor that had 
sought and received a private letter ruling from the IRS permitting disclosure 
of the transaction at issue.  The proposed overdisclosure penalty would supple-
ment, not replace, the nondisclosure penalties under current law. 
Last, the IRS should reconsider the type of information it requires taxpayers 
to provide in their disclosure statements.  As this Article illustrates, the current 
disclosure model relies heavily on the taxpayer’s written description of a 
transaction, a description that can be lengthy and complex.19  In contrast to this 
model, I suggest that the IRS require corporate and partnership taxpayers to 
provide certain non-tax documentation, such as written descriptions of disclosed 
transactions that the taxpayers prepared for actors other than the IRS, such 
as chief executive officers, boards of directors, shareholders, or partners.  
This approach, I argue, would better enable the IRS to sort abusive transactions 
from nonabusive ones and could discourage taxpayers from filing unnecessary 
disclosure statements. 
The remainder of this Article is presented as follows: Part I discusses 
how the IRS currently searches for tax shelters.  Part II offers specific exam-
ples of the overdisclosure response.  Part III investigates the overdisclosure 
incentives under current law for conservative taxpayers and advisors, on the 
one hand, and aggressive taxpayers and advisors, on the other.  Finally, Part 
IV offers and elaborates on the three aforementioned proposals for addressing 
and limiting the overdisclosure response. 
                                                                                                                            
 18. See infra notes 259–260 and accompanying text. 
 19. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXAMINATION GUIDE—ABUSIVE TAX SHELTERS AND 
TRANSACTIONS, pt. III.A.1, at 2–6 (2003), available at http://ftp.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/iii.a_-_sources_to_ 
identify_shelters.pdf (describing role of reportable transaction statement in IRS audits). 
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I. THE SEARCH FOR TAX SHELTERS 
A. The Elusive Nature of Tax Shelters 
An abusive tax shelter is a tax strategy that produces amazing tax bene-
fits that Congress never envisioned, but that seem to flow, at least on a strict 
constructionist reading, from the text of the Internal Revenue Code.  At first 
glance, tax shelters resemble legitimate business deals that ought to receive 
the tax treatment claimed.  As prominent tax lawyer Peter Canellos once 
commented, “tax shelters bear a relationship to real transactions analogous to 
the relationship between money laundering and banking.”20  The close resem-
blance between a real business deal and a tax shelter is what makes the IRS’s 
task of detecting abusive tax planning so difficult. 
Consider, for example, the following stylized version of a popular tax 
shelter strategy that was widely used by America’s most well-known corpora-
tions in the late 1990s:21 
In 1999, Blue Chip Co., a large Fortune 500 corporation, sold stock of 
one of its portfolio investment companies in the open market and earned a $50 
million profit on the sale.  This was wonderful news to the managers of Blue 
Chip Co., except for one pesky detail—the $50 million gain was subject to 
the federal corporate income tax.22 
Tax Director, who was responsible for Blue Chip Co.’s tax planning and 
compliance, quickly arranged a meeting with Accountant.  After Tax Director 
signed a confidentiality agreement, Accountant described how Blue Chip 
Co.’s $50 million taxable gain could vanish if Blue Chip Co. engaged in a series 
of transaction steps otherwise known as the “contingent liability” tax strategy.  
Upon Accountant’s advice, Blue Chip Co. incorporated a new subsidiary 
corporation (Sub), contributed $51 million cash plus $50 million worth of 
healthcare claims that were outstanding against Blue Chip Co. to Sub, and 
then, days later, sold the stock of Sub to a trust created by Blue Chip Co. for 
                                                                                                                            
 20. Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business 
Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 52 (2001). 
 21. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006).  For 
thorough discussion of this transaction, see Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability 
Shelter: ‘A Thing of Grace and Beauty’?, 106 TAX NOTES 577 (2005) and Ethan Yale, Reexamining 
Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 223 (2005).  See also STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON 
CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION 
ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 109–35 (Comm. Print 2003) (outlining “Project 
Tanya” and “Project Valor,” contingent liability tax shelters that Enron utilized in the late 1990s). 
 22. Assuming a 35 percent tax rate, this taxable gain would result in a $17.5 million tax 
liability for Blue Chip Co. 
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its fair market value, $1 million, in cash.23  Accountant guaranteed Tax 
Director that these steps would allow Blue Chip Co. to claim a tax loss 
that—like magic—would cause Blue Chip Co.’s $50 million taxable gain to 
disappear.  So sure was Accountant of the validity of this tax position that he 
promised to refund his own $1 million fee if the IRS successfully challenged 
the tax position.24 
When Tax Director filed Blue Chip Co.’s 1999 annual tax return with 
the IRS, he did not report the contingent liability transaction described 
above or any of his dealings with Accountant.  Nor did Tax Director reveal 
the technical interpretation of the tax law that enabled Blue Chip Co. to 
claim a $50 million tax loss on the sale of the Sub stock for $1 million.25  And 
Tax Director certainly did not disclose that Blue Chip Co. did not actually 
lose $50 million in this transaction. 
Not until the IRS audited the tax return of Blue Chip Co. several years 
later did its agents uncover the facts surrounding the transaction.  In the 
audit, IRS agents questioned Tax Director about Blue Chip Co.’s sale of the Sub 
stock and requested all documentation related to the transaction.  The IRS 
determined that the principal purpose of Accountant’s transaction was for 
Blue Chip Co. to enjoy a valuable tax benefit.  As the IRS and, later, the 
courts would determine,26 the contingent liability transaction was an abusive 
tax shelter, a transaction that lacked “economic substance” and was inconsis-
tent with Congress’s intent. 
But by the time the IRS understood the true nature of Blue Chip Co.’s 
transaction, hundreds of other taxpayers had met with Accountant and also 
                                                                                                                            
 23. The fair market value of the Sub stock was $1 million because it held $51 million of 
assets (cash) and $50 million of liabilities. 
 24. The fee of tax shelter promoters is often based on a percentage of the tax savings a 
particular product generates.  When Enron engaged in contingent liability tax shelters Project 
Tanya and Project Valor, it paid its advisor, Arthur Anderson, $500,000 and $100,000, respectively.  
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., supra note 21, at 123, 127; see also David Cay 
Johnston, Sham Shelters for Businesses Flourish as Scrutiny Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at A1 
(describing fee structure of tax shelter promoters). 
 25. The tax theory was that Blue Chip Co.’s contribution of the $51 million of cash and 
$50 million of liabilities would qualify as a tax-free transaction because, in exchange, Blue Chip 
Co. would receive sufficient stock in Sub to control Sub immediately after the contribution.  See 
I.R.C. § 351 (2006).  Blue Chip Co.’s tax basis in its newly received Sub stock would normally 
equal the value of the cash contributed reduced by any liabilities assumed by Sub.  See I.R.C. 
§ 358(a)(1) (2006).  However, under the tax law at the time of this transaction, Blue Chip Co. 
argued that it was not required to reduce its basis in the Sub stock because the liabilities were the 
type that would “give rise to a deduction” in the hands of Blue Chip Co.  I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) 
(2006).  Thus, Blue Chip Co. assumed a $51 million tax basis in its Sub stock and when it 
received $1 million on the sale of this stock, it claimed a $50 million capital loss for tax purposes. 
 26. See Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d 431; Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 
(Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007); I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
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pursued the contingent liability transaction to claim large tax losses.27  What 
made this particular tax strategy so popular was that, precisely as Accountant 
had suggested, it appeared to be “perfectly legal,”28 fitting squarely within the 
technical language of the tax law.29  No specific statutory rule, at that time, 
prevented Blue Chip Co. from claiming its tax loss.30 
B. Red Flag Requirements 
The widespread use of tax shelters like the contingent liability strategy 
imposes social costs.  When taxpayers engage in abusive tax planning, the 
government loses revenue.  Congress may then respond by increasing the tax 
rates that apply to other taxpayers.31  From an economic perspective, tax shel-
ter planning is wasteful because individuals dedicate effort to exploiting 
ambiguities in the tax law rather than producing anything of value apart from 
tax savings.32  And frequent newspaper stories of tax shelter activity may decrease 
overall taxpaying morale and, in turn, tax compliance, as taxpayers who do not 
use shelters feel like “chumps” for paying more taxes than necessary.33 
Without help from taxpayers and the individuals who advise them, the 
IRS would face significant obstacles in detecting tax strategies like the contin-
gent liability transaction discussed above.  Current law, consequently, imposes 
an obligation on taxpayers and their advisors to raise red flags for the IRS 
when they participate in transactions that bear tax shelter traits.34 
The law requires taxpayers to file a disclosure statement with the IRS Office 
of Tax Shelter Analysis at its processing facility in Ogden, Utah, if they have 
participated in any “reportable transaction” during the taxable year.35  Agents 
in this office review filings by taxpayers and advisors and determine whether a 
particular tax avoidance strategy merits attention from high-level IRS officials.36 
                                                                                                                            
 27. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, New Tax Shelter Decisions Present Further Problems for the 
IRS, 102 J. TAX’N 211, 211–17 (2005). 
 28. See DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR 
TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE (2003). 
 29. See supra note 25. 
 30. After the IRS learned of the contingent liability tax shelter, Congress enacted a targeted 
statutory fix that prevented its further use.  See I.R.C. § 358(h). 
 31. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 221–22 (2002). 
 32. See id. at 222–23. 
 33. See Blank, supra note 2, at 47–48 (discussing reciprocity theory and tax compliance). 
 34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4 (as amended in 2007) (taxpayer disclosure requirements); 
see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3(d)(1) (2007) (material advisor disclosure requirements). 
 35. See Sheryl Stratton, Inside OTSA: A Bird’s-Eye View of Shelter Central at the IRS, 100 
TAX NOTES 1246, 1246–47 (2003).  Taxpayers are also required to attach the disclosure statement to 
their annual tax returns.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e). 
 36. See Stratton, supra note 35, at 1247. 
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The following transactions are reportable transactions under the tax shel-
ter disclosure rules: 
Listed Transactions.  The most specific type of tax strategy that taxpayers 
must disclose to the IRS is a “listed transaction.”37  A tax strategy is only a 
listed transaction if the government explicitly describes it as such.  Colorfully 
named strategies that the major accounting firms marketed to taxpayers in 
the late 1990s like COBRA (currency options bring reward alternatives)38 
and PICO (personal income company),39 as well as the contingent liability 
transaction,40 occupy this list.  These are the strategies that the government 
considers to be most clearly at odds with congressional intent.  In many cases, 
courts have confirmed the IRS’s view.41  Taxpayers must disclose to the IRS 
any participation in a listed transaction or “substantially similar” transaction.42 
The “substantial similarity” standard enables the IRS to receive necessary 
information about certain abusive tax strategies.  Without this requirement, 
taxpayers and advisors could easily avoid any disclosure obligation by tweaking 
a potentially abusive tax strategy to distinguish it from the listed transactions. 
Transactions of Interest.  Taxpayers must also report their participation in 
any strategy that the IRS describes as a “transaction of interest” or any substan-
tially similar transaction.43  This category is designed to give the IRS flexibility 
to investigate arrangements “for which the IRS and Treasury Department 
lack enough information to determine whether [they] should be identified 
specifically as tax avoidance transaction[s].”44 
Confidential Transactions and Transactions with Contractual Protection.  
Tax shelter promoters may attempt to protect their tax shelter strategies from 
spreading too quickly by forbidding taxpayers who buy them from revealing 
the details to anyone else.45  In addition, to entice buyers, tax shelter promot-
ers may promise taxpayers refunds of their fees if the IRS rejects the strategies 
                                                                                                                            
 37. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2).  The IRS maintains the list of abusive tax shelters on its 
website.  See Internal Revenue Service, Abusive Tax Shelters and Transactions, http://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=97384,00.html (last visited June 9, 2009). 
 38. I.R.S. Notice 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 992. 
 39. I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690. 
 40. I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 41. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 42. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4). 
 43. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6). 
 44. T.D. 9350, 2007-38 I.R.B. 607. 
 45. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: 
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999); Joseph Bankman, The New Market 
in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1780 (1999) (discussing tax shelter promoters’ use of 
confidentiality restrictions). 
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on audit.46  As a result, the law requires taxpayers to disclose transactions 
where they have rights to refunds of fees if promised tax consequences do not 
materialize or where a highly paid advisor limits their ability to describe the 
details of tax advice to others.47 
Loss Transactions.  Many tax shelters seek to shift taxable income to a 
tax-exempt party, enable the use of tax credits, or generate a tax-deductible 
loss.  For this reason, the last category of reportable transactions requires 
taxpayers to disclose “loss transactions,” which consist of certain sales or 
exchanges of stock, assets, and other property that lead taxpayers to claim 
large losses for tax purposes ($10 million in the case of corporations and $2 
million in the case of individuals).48 
The disclosure requirements described above apply not only to the 
taxpayers that engage in reportable transactions, but also to the lawyers, 
accountants, and others who advise them.  If an advisor recommends a 
reportable transaction in exchange for a minimum fee49 and the taxpayer 
actually pursues the transaction, the advisor is characterized by the law as a 
“material advisor.”50  Every material advisor must file a disclosure statement 
with the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis describing the reportable transactions 
they have recommended in exchange for a minimum fee.51  In addition, every 
material advisor must maintain a list of the taxpayers that have caused her to be 
characterized as a material advisor.52  The IRS may request this list at any time.53 
                                                                                                                            
 46. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 45, at 24 (discussing promoters’ refund 
arrangements). 
 47. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(3), (4).  As Leandra Lederman has commented more 
generally, the IRS should consider contact between a third-party tax shelter promoter and taxpayer 
regarding such a “tax-advantaged” strategy as “a red flag suggesting that the transaction—and similar 
transactions engaged in by other taxpayers—warrants closer scrutiny to determine its substantive 
content.”  Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 738–39 (2007). 
 48. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5).  In addition to these categories, the Treasury has recently 
proposed adding patented tax strategies to the list of reportable transactions.  Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6011-4(b)(7), 72 Fed. Reg. 54615, 54617 (Sept. 26, 2007). 
 49. The minimum fee in cases involving listed transactions and transactions of interest is $10,000 
where the advisee is an individual and $25,000 where the advisee is a corporation.  Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.6111-3(b)(3)(i)(B) (2007).  In all other cases, the minimum fee is $50,000 where the advisee is an 
individual and $250,000 where the advisee is a corporation.  Id. § 301.6111-3(b)(3)(i)(A). 
 50. Id. § 301.6111-3(b)(1). 
 51. Id. §§ 301.6111-3(d)(1), (e). 
 52. Id. § 301.6112-1(a) (as amended in 2007). 
 53. Id. § 301.6112-1(e).  In addition to the tax shelter disclosure rules, certain corporate 
taxpayers are subject to disclosure regimes that require them to explain aspects of their financial 
accounting statements.  Large corporate taxpayers file Schedule M-3 with the IRS, a form that 
requires them to reconcile inconsistencies between income they report for income tax and financial 
accounting purposes.  I.R.S. Form 1120, Schedule M-3 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f1120sm3.pdf.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board has also recently taken steps to 
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C. The Appeal of Mandatory Disclosure 
Government officials and academics have widely praised the disclosure 
approach as an effective response to the tax shelter problem.54  They have argued 
that mandatory disclosure rules fortified by monetary penalties aid the audit 
process, chill participation in abusive tax strategies, and serve as an early 
warning system for lawmakers.  Each of these justifications for the mandatory 
disclosure regime is discussed below. 
Audit Roadmap.  If taxpayers and their advisors were not obligated to 
provide some clues to the IRS, the field agents who initially review taxpayers’ 
returns would have a difficult time detecting questionable tax positions. 
Sophisticated tax shelter strategies often appear to comply with the let-
ter of the tax law and certainly do not take the form of tax-protestor type 
arguments.55  In the example of Blue Chip Co.’s contingent liability tax 
shelter, all that would have appeared to the naked eye of an IRS agent 
reviewing Blue Chip Co.’s tax return would be a $50 million tax-deductible 
loss on Schedule D of IRS Form 1120,56 along with many other capital gains 
and losses resulting from Blue Chip Co.’s sales of stock, bonds, and real estate 
during the year. 
In addition, some taxpayers, especially corporations and partnerships, 
file tax returns that are simply enormous.  General Electric Corp.’s 2006 annual 
tax return and accompanying schedules, for instance, were the equivalent of 
over 24,000 pages.57  Further, many individual and business taxpayers are still 
                                                                                                                            
require corporations to highlight tax positions they view as uncertain.  See FIN. ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN 
INCOME TAXES 1–7 (2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2048.pdf.  Because the new 
financial accounting rules have only been in effect since 2006, their ability to “allow users of the 
financial statements to make judgments about management’s [tax] risk appetite” is unclear.  Brett 
Cohen & Reto Micheluzzi, Lifting the Fog: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, 113 TAX 
NOTES 233, 234 (2006). 
 54. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.  Some academics, such as David Weisbach, 
have criticized the current tax shelter disclosure rules as a poor alternative to the introduction of a 
strong anti-abuse doctrine as a response to the tax shelter problem.  David A. Weisbach, The Failure of 
Disclosure as an Approach to Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 73, 73–74 (2001).  But even Weisbach concedes 
that the use of tax shelter disclosure as a means of detection “will do no harm.”  Id. at 73. 
 55. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 45, at 6 (“[Tax shelters] typically rely on one 
or more discontinuities of the tax law.”). 
 56. Corporate taxpayers are required to report their gains and losses from the sales of 
capital assets on Schedule D of IRS Form 1120.  See I.R.S. Form 1120, Schedule D (2008), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120sd.pdf. 
 57. Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS E-file Moves Forward; Successfully Executes 
Electronic Filing of Nation’s Largest Tax Return (May 31, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
article/0,,id=157845,00.html. 
Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter Detection 1641 
 
 
permitted to file their tax returns on paper, rather than in electronic form.58  
The massive amount of information in some tax returns, coupled with the 
limited audit resources of the IRS, presents serious challenges to detection. 
Mandatory disclosure is thus designed to provide an important “audit 
roadmap” to the IRS.59  For example, as mentioned, under current law a 
taxpayer is now required to alert the IRS if the taxpayer uses a tax strategy 
sold by a tax shelter promoter who promised a money-back guarantee in the 
event of an audit.60  The required disclosure statement may lead the IRS 
agent who initially reviews this tax return to select it for audit and quickly 
issue an information document request to the taxpayer.61  This enables the 
IRS to collect pertinent information regarding the transaction, which may 
result in a successful challenge of the tax benefits claimed. 
Early Communication.  The mandatory disclosure regime also serves an 
important communication function.  The IRS typically releases a public 
announcement or notice when it designates a tax strategy as a listed transaction 
or transaction of interest.62  These announcements describe the mechanical 
details of the scheme at issue, so that taxpayers and advisors know what to 
disclose.  The IRS also uses these announcements to present its reasoning for why 
the underlying tax strategy is inconsistent with congressional intent or would 
fail in court under the economic substance, business purpose, or other judicial 
doctrine.  The IRS can issue such notices quickly, without waiting for public 
comment or congressional approval.63  The need for frequent public guidance 
in a mandatory disclosure regime thus provides a quick-and-dirty way for the 
IRS to express its early condemnation of abusive tax strategies before their 
use spreads. 
Chilling Effects.  Finally, mandatory disclosure may deter taxpayers and 
advisors from pursuing tax strategies that are, or that may become, reportable 
transactions in the future.  When the IRS announces that a tax strategy is 
potentially abusive and, in turn, subjects it to mandatory disclosure require-
ments, use of that strategy ceases.  As the New York State Bar Association 
                                                                                                                            
 58. A corporation that files fewer than 250 returns (including information returns) in a 
given year is not required to file electronically.  Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6011-5 (a)(1), (d)(5) (2007). 
 59. See Pearlman, supra note 4, at 294–98 (suggesting audit efficiency as one of the prime 
rationales for enhanced tax shelter disclosure). 
 60. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (as amended in 2007). 
 61. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 19, pt. III.A.1, at 6. 
 62. For a list of these public announcements, see Internal Revenue Service, Tax Information 
for Corporations, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations (last visited Apr. 21, 2009). 
 63. For a discussion of the procedure the IRS uses to issue notices, see TAX SECTION, N.Y. 
STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT NO. 1126, REPORT ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS AMENDING THE 
REPORTABLE TRANSACTION DISCLOSURE AND LIST MAINTENANCE RULES 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1126rpt.pdf. 
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Tax Section has noted, “listed transactions have acquired a type of stigma.  
Many taxpayers have a written policy against engaging in any listed transac-
tion and it appears that some malpractice insurers want to know whether 
their insureds provide advice with respect to listed transactions.”64  Instead of 
pursuing tax strategies that the IRS has already designated as listed transac-
tions or transactions of interest, most sophisticated taxpayers prefer to exploit 
gaps in the tax law that have yet to appear on the IRS’s radar screen.65 
II. THE OVERDISCLOSURE RESPONSE 
Despite the appeal of mandatory disclosure as a way to bolster the IRS’s 
ability to detect and challenge abuse, this approach is subject to a serious vul-
nerability: Taxpayers and their advisors may provide too much information to 
the IRS.  If taxpayers and advisors disclose information about transactions 
that are complex yet clearly not abusive, or transaction details that do not 
reveal underlying abuse, the mandatory disclosure regime fails to accomplish 
one of its principal purposes: helping the IRS find tax shelters.  In the words 
of one IRS official, “if the default approach becomes disclosing every transac-
tion, ‘the system is not going to work.’”66 
While commentators in the past have occasionally discussed the risk of 
overdisclosure in hypothetical terms,67 the IRS’s experience since implement-
ing the mandatory disclosure regime in 2000 confirms that the overdisclosure 
problem is more than mere academic conjecture.  The number of disclosure 
statements submitted to the IRS appears to have increased dramatically in 
recent years.  In 2007, an official at the IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis 
stated that the number of reportable transaction disclosure statements 
received by his office since 2004 had increased by over 7,300 percent and 
                                                                                                                            
 64. Id. at 7 n.11. 
 65. See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a 
Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2005) (“[T]he government cannot win this game”). 
 66. Crystal Tandon, Too Many Unlisted Transactions Being Reported, IRS Officials Say, 113 
TAX NOTES 203, 203 (2006) (quoting Christopher B. Sterner, IRS division counsel, Large and 
Midsize Business Division). 
 67. See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” in New Bottles, 55 TAX 
L. REV. 135, 151 n.194 (2002) (hypothesizing that “the Service may well be overwhelmed with 
‘overdisclosures,’ in which case the regulations [will be] unlikely to have a meaningful impact”); 
Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 3 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law & Econ. Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 07-05, 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 (theorizing that mandatory disclosure rules 
may be “compromised by taxpayer over-disclosure”). 
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that “maintaining the right number of disclosures and making sure they were 
all appropriate was a challenge.”68 
Data available from state taxing authorities strongly implies, however, 
that the IRS has experienced a much greater increase in the submission of 
reportable transaction disclosure statements.  Several states require taxpayers 
that file reportable transaction disclosure statements with the IRS to file a 
similar, if not the same, statement with the state taxing authority.69  For the 
2005 and 2006 tax years, the New York State Department of Taxation and 
Finance announced that it received over 28,000 reportable transaction 
disclosure statements from individual and corporate taxpayers.70  Because New 
York requires taxpayers to file a copy of the very same reportable transaction 
disclosure statement that they filed with the IRS, this figure reveals the 
number of statements that the IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis most likely 
received just from taxpayers in a single state over a two-year period.  It is 
especially striking considering that prior to 2004, the number of disclosure 
statements that the IRS received from taxpayers and advisors on a nationwide 
basis each year often numbered in the hundreds, not thousands.71 
A. What Is Overdisclosure? 
Even the most ardent supporters of the mandatory disclosure regime 
concede that there are limits to its value.  Dennis Ventry, for instance, has 
written that “[o]f course there is such a thing as too much disclosure, where 
the government cannot process the information or the taxpayer is overbur-
dened by the requirements.”72  The question, then, is how much and what 
type of information is too much? 
If the IRS operated with an unlimited budget and bench of specialized 
experts, there would be no harm in the submission of disclosure statements or 
accompanying materials that do not have a reasonable chance of exposing tax 
                                                                                                                            
 68. Sam Young, Officials Provide Update on Status of Tax Shelter Guidance, 115 TAX NOTES 
707, 707 (2007) (quoting an IRS Office of Tax Shelter Analysis official). 
 69. For instance, under legislation enacted in 2005, New York has mandated “every taxpayer 
required to file a reportable or listed transaction disclosure statement with the Internal Revenue Service, 
to attach a duplicate disclosure statement to the New York tax return.”  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
TAXATION AND FIN., TAX SHELTER REPORTING 1 (2007), available at http://www.tax.state.ny.us/pdf/ 
stats/policy_special/tax_shelter_reporting/tax_shelter_reporting.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 2. 
 71. In 2001, for example, the IRS received an aggregate of 86 reportable transaction disclosure 
statements on a nationwide basis.  LARGE & MID-SIZE BUS., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ABUSIVE 
CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ 
abbakppr.pdf. 
 72. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 477 (2008). 
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shelters.  The IRS would simply discard that information and focus instead 
on disclosure statements that may reveal the details of potentially abusive 
tax strategies. 
Unfortunately, this characterization of the tax shelter landscape is far from 
realistic, as the IRS operates with both a limited budget and limited staff. 
The IRS’s limited funds73 have, in recent years, forced field agents of the 
IRS’s Large and Midsize Business Division to reduce the length of audits of 
large corporate and other business taxpayers.74  In fiscal year 2007, for example, 
the IRS’s audit rates of the largest corporate taxpayers dropped to its lowest 
level since the late 1980s.75 
And despite the IRS’s description of the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis 
as a sophisticated command-and-control center capable of reviewing thou-
sands of taxpayer and advisor disclosure statements,76 its staff, according to 
public reports, is of surprisingly modest size.77  Describing the challenges that 
this unit faces at a U.S. Senate hearing in 2003, Calvin Johnson colorfully 
testified, “I doubt their total annual budget would cover the annual Holiday 
Parties for the Skunk Works factories they are competing against.”78 
In light of these constraints on the IRS, when taxpayers disclose informa-
tion that is not relevant to the detection of abusive tax planning, the mandatory 
disclosure regime may have the opposite of its intended effect.  As a Treasury 
Department official once described the problem, “Overdisclosure transactions 
are the transactions that don’t have the potential for abuse.  They not only 
place a burden on taxpayers, but also place a burden on the Service.”79  Instead 
of helping field agents detect known abusive strategies, or even better, discover 
new strategies the IRS is not yet aware of, excessive disclosure statements 
may distract the IRS and consume valuable audit resources. 
                                                                                                                            
 73. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Shelter Penalties Are Unclear and Weakly Enforced, Panelists 
Say, 120 TAX NOTES 383, 385 (2008) (quoting an IRS official as stating that “the audit level has 
been ‘cut to the bone’”). 
 74. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Audits of Largest Corporations Slide 
to All Time Low, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/v13 (last visited June 9, 2009). 
 75. See id. at fig.1 (illustrating the decline in IRS audit rates of corporations with assets of 
$250 million or more from 64 percent in 1988 to 26 percent in 2007). 
 76. See I.R.S. Announcement 2000-12, 2000-1 CB 835 (describing Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis as “centralized point for the review of tax shelter transactions”). 
 77. Sheryl Stratton, supra note 35, at 1246 (“For all it has to do, OTSA is surprisingly 
sparsely staffed—it has seven program analysts, one manager, and no attorneys.”). 
 78. U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: 
Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
108th Cong. 296 (2004) (statement of Calvin H. Johnson, Professor, University of Texas at Austin School 
of Law). 
 79. Stamper & Stratton, supra note 8, at 785 (quoting Jonathan Ackerman, Attorney-
Advisor with Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy). 
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But exactly what type of information constitutes overdisclosure? 
Imagine that a corporation files a disclosure statement with the IRS and 
also attaches its last ten annual reports, consisting of hundreds of pages, 
which are required to be filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  Some of this information, such as lengthy descriptions of offi-
cer biographies and current industry trends, concerns “transactions that don’t 
have the potential for abuse.”80 
IRS agents reviewing this submission would likely discard the annual 
reports as irrelevant and instead focus on the written discussion from the tax-
payer.  Surely overdisclosure cannot encompass all information that fails to 
reveal potentially abusive tax strategies. 
Overdisclosure, rather, must not only fail to reveal potential abuse, but 
also must consume enough attention of IRS agents to “place a burden on the 
Service.”81  As opposed to hundreds of pages of publicly available annual 
reports, the type of disclosure statements that burden the Service are those 
describing highly complex transactions, which not only likely comply with a 
technical reading of the tax law, but also the underlying intent of Congress.  
The difference between this type of disclosure and the information described 
above is that the IRS cannot easily discard this type as irrelevant to tax 
shelter detection. 
The most comprehensive definition, then, is that overdisclosure is the 
submission of information that (1) fails to report participation in a potential 
tax shelter, and that (2) the IRS cannot easily identify as failing to report par-
ticipation in a potential tax shelter. 
B. Examples of Overdisclosure 
Overdisclosure can occur in a variety of ways.  This Subpart offers con-
crete examples of the types of overdisclosure that the IRS has received from 
taxpayers and their advisors since the introduction of the mandatory tax shel-
ter reporting regime in 2000. 
1. Nonabusive Reportable Transactions 
As IRS officials have complained, when the IRS issues rulings that require 
taxpayers to disclose participation in specific abusive tax strategies, the Service 
frequently receives many disclosure statements regarding uncontroversial, 
                                                                                                                            
 80. Id.  I thank Alex Raskolnikov for helpful discussions regarding this point. 
 81. Id. 
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nonabusive business activities.82  In a 2006 meeting of the Tax Executives 
Institute, an industry association of corporate tax directors, a lead IRS lawyer 
commented that “[t]oo many routine business transactions are being reported 
to the IRS.”83  The following taxpayer and advisor reactions illustrate this type 
of overdisclosure. 
Intermediary Corporation Tax Shelter.  The IRS’s initial attempts to collect 
information regarding the intermediary corporation tax shelter84 led many 
taxpayers and advisors to file disclosure statements regarding real, non-tax-
motivated business deals. 
The intermediary corporation tax shelter was a real sale between a buyer 
and seller that was structured “in a ‘funny’ way . . . to achieve tax benefits 
clearly unintended by Congress.”85 
In a typical structure, a corporation (Seller) owned stock in a target 
corporation (Target) that itself owned an appreciated asset, such as real estate, 
which another corporation (Buyer) desired to own.  If Buyer were to purchase 
the stock of Target from Seller, Target would continue to hold real estate with 
a built-in taxable gain waiting to be recognized, and if Buyer were to purchase 
the real estate directly from Target, Target would incur immediate taxable gain. 
To alleviate this potential tax cost, Seller would sell its stock in Target to 
an intermediary corporation (Intermediary) that had large tax losses or cred-
its.  Intermediary would then quickly cause Target to sell its real estate to 
Buyer.86  After the dust settled, Intermediary and Target would file tax returns 
on a consolidated basis for federal income tax purposes.87  The parties claimed 
that Seller recognized taxable gain only on the sale of Target stock to Interme-
diary, that Buyer held the real estate with a tax basis equal to its fair market 
                                                                                                                            
 82. See, e.g., Heather Bennett, DeNovio Clarifies IRS Disclosure Policy on Reportable 
Transactions, 105 TAX NOTES 15 (2004) (including statements by Nicholas J. DeNovio, IRS 
Deputy Chief Counsel, asking taxpayers not to overdisclose routine business transactions); 
SECTION OF TAXATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS CONCERNING PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
UNDER SECTIONS 6011, 6111, AND 6112, at 11 (2007) (“Treasury and IRS officials have 
repeatedly acknowledged the difficulties caused by over-disclosure [of routine transactions].”).  
 83. Tandon, supra note 66, at 203 (referring to the general sentiment among IRS officials 
at the meeting).  
 84. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730 (describing the mechanics of the intermediary 
corporation tax shelter). 
 85. Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, 
and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 337 (2002). 
 86. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730.  In an alternative version of the tax 
strategy, instead of corporation with tax losses, the intermediary corporation might be a tax-exempt 
entity, like a public charity.  Id. 
 87. Corporations that file consolidated federal tax returns are generally treated as a single 
taxable unit, where the tax losses and credits of one group member offset the tax gains of another 
group member.  I.R.C. §§ 1502–1503 (2006). 
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value, and last, that Intermediary did not bear any tax liability because its tax 
losses or credits offset the tax gain of Target.88 
After learning that accounting firms had been actively marketing the 
intermediary corporation tax shelter, the IRS designated this tax strategy as a 
listed transaction in Notice 2001-16, thus subjecting it to mandatory disclo-
sure.89  The IRS argued that Intermediary should be disregarded or treated as 
an agent of Seller, and furthered other theories that would cause Seller to be 
“properly characterized” as selling the assets of Target directly to Buyer.90  The 
types of transactions the IRS attempted to describe were parties’ coordinated 
efforts to structure their transactions to avoid federal income tax, but not 
serve any other real business purpose.  In one case pending at the time of the 
IRS’s notice, taxpayers had used a Native American tribe as the intermediary, 
and the tribe caused the entity it acquired from the selling corporation to dis-
pose of its assets within ten minutes of its purchase.91 
In the years following the IRS’s designation of the intermediary corpora-
tion tax shelter as a listed transaction, however, some taxpayers and advisors 
responded by disclosing routine business transactions lacking abuse poten-
tial.92  Taxpayers disclosed ordinary sales of stock in which the purchaser 
happened to be a tax-exempt organization or a corporation with substantial 
tax credits.93  The IRS did not intend to require disclosure of these types of 
transactions because they were motivated by real business purposes, not mere 
tax avoidance.  Yet tax lawyers advised their clients to be wary that a “seller of 
corporate stock [could] become an unwitting participant in a ‘listed transaction’ 
shelter if its buyer happened to resell the assets of the acquired entity in a 
transaction that was sheltered by the buyer’s pre-existing tax benefits.”94 
                                                                                                                            
 88. I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See David Cay Johnston, US Blocks 2 Shelters Intended to Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
2001, at C4 (discussing John H. Phipps, Inc. v. Commissioner, No. 9695-00 (T.C. Sept. 13, 2000), a case 
before the United States Tax Court, involving recharacterization of a stock sale as an asset sale due to 
use of Native American tribe intermediary, based on I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730). 
 92. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406; Letter From David S. Miller, Chair, New 
York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section to Eric Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Dep’t of the 
Treasury & Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, Internal Revenue Serv. (May 23, 2008), available at http:// 
www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Tax_Section_Reports_2008&CONTENTID=16428&TEMP
LATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.  
 93. For a discussion of this practice as it relates to hedge funds, see Michael Kosnitzky, 
Protective Filings for Hedge Funds After the Jobs Act, 109 TAX NOTES 817 (2005). 
 94. Wayne R. Strasbaugh, IRS Lays Mine Field for Some Stock Transactions, BALLARD 
SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP, NEWS & PUBLICATIONS, Jan. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/press/article.asp?ID=1980. 
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After reviewing the types of disclosure statements it received, the IRS 
acknowledged that its notice “identifying the transaction based on the role of 
an entity that appears to be an intermediary may result in over-disclosure.”95 
Notional Principal Contract Tax Shelters.  The reaction of taxpayers and 
advisors to the IRS’s designation of a tax strategy involving “notional prin-
cipal contracts” as a listed transaction provides another example of the 
overdisclosure response.96 
This strategy enabled taxpayers to exploit the rules governing notional 
principal contracts, and claim large tax-deductible losses that could be used to 
offset other unrelated taxable income.97  Two parties, A and B, would enter 
into a contract lasting more than a year, in which A would make periodic 
payments to B based on a fixed or floating rate multiplied against a notional 
principal amount.  B, in turn, would make a single back-end payment at the 
end of the contract to A.  The key to this tax shelter was the structure of B’s 
back-end payment.  A large part of the payment would consist of a non-
contingent component (for example, part of the payment would be based on 
a specific fixed rate index) and a much smaller part of B’s back-end payment 
would consist of a contingent component (for example, it could depend on 
the market value of certain stock).  By structuring the back-end payment 
from B to include both noncontingent and contingent components, A would 
claim tax deductions for its payments to B currently and would not accrue 
any of the back-end payment in income until it received it from B.98  In many 
cases, the parties would terminate their contract prior to B’s scheduled back-
end payment and A would simply reports its gain or loss on the termination 
of the swap agreement as a capital gain or loss. 
In 2002, the IRS announced that this type of highly engineered notional 
principal contract was a listed transaction.99  As a substantive legal matter, the 
IRS ruled in Notice 2002-35 that the tax law required taxpayers to accrue in 
income the noncontingent portion of B’s back-end payment “in a manner that 
reflects the economic substance of the contract” and that the IRS would chal-
lenge the strategy by applying various substance-over-form recharacterizations.100 
In response to the IRS’s notice, the Service was overwhelmed by a 
“flood of disclosures” from taxpayers and advisors regarding “plain vanilla” 
                                                                                                                            
 95. I.R.S. Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406, superseded by I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-
51 I.R.B. 1299. 
 96. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 992 (describing notional principal contract tax 
shelters). 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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total return equity swaps and other nonabusive swap agreements.101  A total 
return equity swap is like the notional principal contract described above, 
except that the back-end payment is wholly contingent.  In a total return 
equity swap, A makes payments to B during the term of the contract and at 
the end of the contract, B makes a back-end payment to A that is based solely 
on some contingency, such as the market change in the value of a certain 
company’s stock.102  The total return equity swap is a customary commercial 
transaction motivated by genuine business purposes, not one engineered to 
achieve tax avoidance.103 
In 2006, the IRS conceded publicly that its notice had “caused taxpayers 
to file large numbers of disclosure statements on Form 8886, Reportable 
Transaction Disclosure Statement, for common transactions, such as total 
return swaps, that are entered into for bona fide non-tax purposes.”104 
Transactions with Tax Insurance.  A final example of overdisclosure of 
nonabusive reportable transactions is the response from taxpayers and advi-
sors to the Treasury’s initial request for disclosure of transactions in which the 
expected tax results were protected by tax insurance. 
A taxpayer that engages in aggressive tax planning may purchase tax 
insurance from third-party carriers in an attempt to minimize its potential 
expected cost in the event that the IRS successfully challenges its claimed tax 
benefits.105  In an early version of the tax shelter reporting rules released in 
2002, the Treasury required taxpayers to disclose their participation in any 
transaction “for which the taxpayer has . . . contractual protection against the 
possibility that part or all of the intended tax consequences from the transac-
tion will not be sustained.”106 
After the release of these regulations, taxpayers disclosed their participa-
tion in routine, nonabusive business transactions for which they had purchased 
tax insurance.  Taxpayers that had purchased tax insurance in connection 
with like-kind exchanges, for example, disclosed their participation in these 
exchanges to the IRS, even though Congress specifically intended for these 
                                                                                                                            
 101. Tandon, supra note 66, at 203.  
 102. See Gina Biondo & Allison Rosier, The Effect of the Proposed Swap Regulations on the 
Hedge Fund Industry: Goodbye to Total Return Swaps?, 103 TAX NOTES 1171, 1172 (2004) 
(describing “plain vanilla” total return equity swap arrangements). 
 103. See id. at 1171–72. 
 104. I.R.S. Notice 2006-16, 2006-9 I.R.B. 538. 
 105. See Logue, supra note 2, at 343–44. 
 106. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1. 6011-4T(b)(4) (2002). 
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transactions to convey beneficial tax treatment.107  Other taxpayers reported 
legitimate business transactions, such as mergers between public corporations, 
where one party to the transaction had agreed to indemnify the other party for 
certain tax liabilities.108 
After reviewing disclosure statements from taxpayers and advisors, the 
Treasury acknowledged the overdisclosure response, commenting that many 
taxpayers had interpreted the rules to require “numerous legitimate business 
transactions with tax indemnities [as] subject to reporting.”109 
2. Unnecessary Protective Disclosures 
As I will argue shortly, the IRS received many of the unnecessary disclo-
sure statements described above because some taxpayers and advisors believed 
that the disclosed tax strategies were reportable transactions.110  But taxpayers 
and advisors may also file these types of disclosure statements with the IRS 
on a protective basis in cases where they are unsure whether disclosure is 
even required. 
The tax shelter reporting rules specifically authorize the filing of protec-
tive disclosure statements whenever taxpayers and advisors are “uncertain 
whether a transaction must be disclosed.”111  The only condition is that 
taxpayers and advisors must provide the IRS with as much information in a 
protective disclosure statement regarding the disclosed transaction as they 
would in an ordinary disclosure statement required by law.112 
Taxpayers and advisors may choose to file a protective disclosure state-
ment for two reasons: 
First, filing protective disclosure statements with the IRS shields taxpayers 
and advisors from high monetary penalties for failing to disclose reportable 
transactions.113 
Second, filing protective disclosure statements relates to tax accrual 
work papers, documents a taxpayer prepares for internal use that reveal which 
                                                                                                                            
 107. See Richard M. Lipton, New Disclosure and Listing Regulations Promise Headaches for 
Everyone, in 1 TENTH ANNUAL REAL ESTATE TAX FORUM 61, 74, 91 (PLI Tax Law & Estate 
Planning, Course Handbook Series No.14248 2008). 
 108. See id. at 74. 
 109. Preamble to Proposed Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 64496 (Nov. 2, 2006). 
 110. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PARTNERSHIP-AUDIT TECHNIQUE GUIDE Ch. 9 
(2007) (“Not all disclosures of reportable transactions disclosed to the Service are abusive.”). 
 111. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(f)(2) (as amended in 2007). 
 112. Id.; see also Instructions for I.R.S. Form 8886, at 5 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/i8886.pdf (explaining that a protective disclosure form is treated the same as an 
ordinary disclosure form). 
 113. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(f)(2). 
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of its tax positions the taxpayer believes are most questionable.  For obvious 
reasons, taxpayers would rather not share these documents with the IRS.  If a 
taxpayer discloses its participation in a listed transaction, or a substantially 
similar one, the IRS will automatically request the taxpayer’s tax accrual work 
papers.114  The IRS has indicated, however, that if a taxpayer files a protective 
disclosure statement and explains why the disclosed transaction is not substan-
tially similar to a listed transaction, the IRS may take a less aggressive stance 
and not request tax accrual work papers.115 
Many taxpayers have filed protective disclosure statements with the IRS 
regarding legitimate, nonabusive business transactions, rather than tax shel-
ters.116  For example, after the IRS issued its notice regarding notional principal 
tax shelters, one commentator noted that because hedge funds “engage in a 
variety of transactions . . . that may resemble reportable transactions[,] . . . hedge 
funds, as a common practice, have filed a protective Form 8886 even if they 
believed that the transaction was not listed or abusive.”117  IRS and Treasury 
officials have confirmed that since the enactment of monetary penalties for 
failure to disclose a reportable transaction, “[p]eople are making a lot of 
protective disclosures”118 and “[s]ome are filing protective disclosures when 
they don’t have to.”119 
3. Extraneous Details and Documentation 
A final category of overdisclosure is the filing of disclosure statements 
containing excessive details or documents that are extraneous to the underly-
ing tax strategies. 
When a taxpayer discloses its participation in a potential tax shelter to 
the IRS, it must also provide a description of the transaction and the taxpayer’s 
view of its expected tax treatment.  The form a taxpayer files to disclose a 
                                                                                                                            
 114. See Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Accrual Workpapers Frequently Asked Questions, 
(April 24, 2007), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=146242,00.html. 
 115. Id. (describing IRS procedures for tax accrual work paper requests in the case of protective 
disclosure statements).  For further discussion, see Todd Simmens, IRS Treats Protective Disclosures 
Inconsistently, 27 TAX ADVISER 426 (2006) (outlining rationale for filing protective disclosure statements). 
 116. George Jones, Treasury Advisor Explains “Transactions of Interest” Disclosure Regulations Designed 
to Give IRS Flexibility, CCH TAX GROUP (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.centerfortaxstudies.com/blog/ 
taxnews/2007/08/21/treasury_advisor_explains_aquot_transact (discussing protective disclosure filings). 
 117. See Kosnitzky, supra note 93, at 817 (2005). 
 118. Jones, supra note 116 (quoting Anita C. Soucy, Attorney-Advisor in the Treasury’s Office of 
Tax Policy). 
 119. Sheryl Stratton, Tax Bar Asks IRS to Disclose More Info About Shelter Disclosures, 115 TAX 
NOTES 20, 20 (2007) (quoting Tara P. Volungis, an attorney in the IRS’s Office of Associate Chief 
Counsel). 
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reportable transaction, Form 8886, contains several lines for describing any 
expected tax benefits, as well as the related steps of the transaction.120 
Some taxpayers provide so much information in their description that 
the IRS may be unable to determine solely from the disclosure statements 
whether the transactions have abuse potential.121  Many taxpayers have 
broadly interpreted the IRS’s instructions to “[i]nclude facts of each step of the 
transaction . . . regardless of the year entered into.”122  As a consequence, they 
may describe many aspects of their transactions that do not relate to the heart of 
a potentially abusive tax strategy.  Even though Form 8886 has only seven lines 
for describing disclosed transactions, taxpayers routinely write “see attached 
pages” at the end of this space and then attach many pages to the disclosure 
form.123  Indeed, the IRS’s instructions explicitly allow for these attachments.124 
Some tax advisors engage in similar overdisclosure.  Advisors are required 
under current law to maintain lists of any taxpayers for which they serve as 
material advisors, meaning they have recommended reportable transactions, 
been paid a minimum threshold fee, and met other requirements.125  When 
the IRS has sought tax shelter investor lists from advisors, many of them have 
“merely provid[ed] boxes of documents in response to the list maintenance 
requests.”126  At a public hearing in 2007, an official from the IRS Office of 
Associate Chief Counsel confirmed that one challenge the IRS has faced in 
soliciting information from advisors is that “many of the disclosures are 
incomplete or provide[d in] boxes of documents without an index.”127 
                                                                                                                            
 120. I.R.S. Form 8886 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8886.pdf. 
 121. See Stratton, supra note 119. 
 122. I.R.S. Form 8886, l. 7b, supra note 120,  at 2; see also Instructions for I.R.S. Form 8886, supra 
note 112, at 6 (“Describe each step of the transaction including all information known to you.”). 
 123. See Instructions for I.R.S. Form 8886, supra note 112, at 5 (providing instructions for 
attaching additional pages). 
 124. See id. 
 125. Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3(b)(3)(i) (2007) (minimum material advisor fees). 
 126. Richard M. Lipton & Robert S. Walton, Final Regulations for the Tax Shelter Disclosure 
Regime: Making the Rules More User Friendly, 107 J. TAX’N 196, 203 (2007). 
 127. Stratton, supra note 119, at 20 (quoting Christine Ellison, Branch Chief in the IRS’s 
Office of Associate Chief Counsel).  This type of response to requests for information from the 
IRS has become embedded in popular consciousness.  For example, in a scene from the 2006 film 
Stranger Than Fiction, Ana Pascal, the owner of a small café under audit by IRS agent Harold 
Crick, hands Crick a large box bulging with papers, commenting “My tax files and receipts for the 
last three years.”  An incredulous Crick queries, “You keep your files like this?”  Pascal responds, 
“No.  Actually I’m quite fastidious.  I put them in this box just to screw with you.”  STRANGER 
THAN FICTION (Columbia Pictures, 2006). 
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C. Threats to Tax Administration 
Overdisclosure poses serious threats to the effective and efficient admini-
stration of the tax system: it distracts the IRS from detecting abuse, slows the 
enactment of statutory solutions, and constitutes wasteful taxpayer behavior. 
Detection Distraction.  Unnecessary disclosure statements consume valu-
able IRS resources that could otherwise be allocated to the detection of abusive 
tax activity.  Every reportable transaction disclosure statement is, in theory, 
subject to several levels of internal review within the IRS.128  But more 
importantly, it is often impossible to distinguish a disclosure statement con-
cerning an abusive tax shelter from one describing an ordinary, nonabusive 
transaction without thorough analysis and, often, follow-up questions to the 
taxpayer or advisor who filed the statement. 
For example, a taxpayer that has sold stock to a tax-exempt entity may 
file a disclosure statement with the IRS reporting participation in an interme-
diary corporation tax shelter—a listed transaction.129  There may be no way 
for the IRS agents in the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis to determine whether 
the disclosed transaction is actually part of a larger abusive scheme without 
investigating the roles of additional parties.  If it turns out that the taxpayer 
filed its disclosure statement merely out of caution, and not because it par-
ticipated in a transaction solely designed to avoid federal income tax, the 
taxpayer will have consumed hours of the IRS’s attention that could have 
been dedicated to investigating taxpayers involved in much more question-
able tax planning. 
Further, the sheer volume of unnecessary disclosure statements that the 
IRS may receive in response to particular requests may impair its ability to 
review all of these requests fully, if at all.  For instance, in its annual report for 
2006, the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council (IRSAC) discussed its 
review of the IRS’s procedures for analyzing reportable transaction disclosure 
statements.130  The IRSAC report explained: 
Based upon meetings with [Large & Midsize Business Division] offi-
cials, IRSAC members did not initially get to a comfort level that 
anything had been done with these forms by [the Office of Tax Shelter 
                                                                                                                            
 128. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 19, pt. III.A.I, at 6 (describing multiple 
levels of internal IRS review). 
 129. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text. 
 130. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY COUNCIL, PUBLIC MEETING BRIEFING 
BOOK 10–16 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2006_irsac_public_meeting.pdf. 
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Analysis] on a timely basis. . . . [W]e were told that these filings were 
stacked in an office in Ogden waiting to be processed.131 
Over the course of its review, IRSAC learned that “taxpayers who have made 
disclosures have either had no follow-up contacts with the IRS or, alterna-
tively, have simply received a ‘tax shelter identification number’ to include 
on their returns.”132  Because excessive reporting of ordinary transactions may 
cause disclosure statements that describe abusive tax planning to become lost 
in the shuffle, IRSAC concluded that the “IRS should implement measures 
to reduce overdisclosure of transactions that are not reportable transactions.”133 
Slowed Statutory Solutions.  When the mandatory disclosure regime 
works well, it enables the IRS to learn about new types of abusive tax 
planning and, assuming taxpayers properly disclose, the scale of participation 
by taxpayers.  IRS officials may then warn Congress that specific statutory 
changes are needed to halt the use of particular abusive tax strategies.134  The 
government has acknowledged that a purpose of the mandatory disclosure 
regime is to “allow the IRS, the Treasury Department, and, to the extent 
necessary, the Congress sufficient time to react to and stop the spread of the 
latest fad in the corporate tax shelter genre.”135  For example, shortly after the IRS 
discovered that many taxpayers were engaging in the contingent liability 
transaction that Blue Chip Co. in Part I used to avoid capital gains taxation, 
Congress passed a specific provision, Section 358(h) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which prevented taxpayers like Blue Chip Co. from claiming large 
capital losses using the strategy in the future.136 
Because overdisclosure distracts the IRS, it slows its ability to alert 
Congress that a targeted statutory solution to “the latest fad”137 in abusive tax 
planning is needed.  As a result, the “Wall Street rule” may take hold, meaning 
taxpayers believe that the IRS or Congress will not challenge a particular tax 
strategy if there is “long-standing and generally accepted understanding of 
this expected tax treatment.”138  Even though the Wall Street rule has no legal 
basis, when so many taxpayers have adopted a particular tax position, Congress 
may wait to change the law until after it has held hearings or the IRS and 
                                                                                                                            
 131. Id. at 7–8. 
 132. Id. at 12. 
 133. Id. at 16. 
 134. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 45, at 84 (describing the purpose of the 
mandatory disclosure regime). 
 135. Id. 
 136. I.R.C. § 358(h) (2006) (which would prevent Blue Chip Co.’s tax loss on sale). 
 137. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 45, at 84. 
 138. See Mark Battersby, Tax Watch: The ‘Wall Street Rule’ Isn’t a Rule of Law, the IRS Insists, 
INVESTMENT NEWS, October 6, 2003, at 17. 
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taxpayers have butted heads in court.  Without the effects of overdisclosure, 
however, the IRS may be able to warn Congress of a particular defect in the 
law before its exploitation by taxpayers has spread.  At that early stage, 
Congress may be more amenable to enacting a technical correction to the law. 
Wasteful Behavior.  Last, overdisclosure represents wasteful behavior.  
When taxpayers and advisors expend time and resources describing the 
details of tax strategies that are not abusive but that, technically, may be 
reportable transactions, they do this in place of activities that could at least 
provide some social benefit.139  Just as “[n]o new medicines are found, computer 
chips designed, or homeless housed”140 as a result of abusive tax planning, the 
same can be said of overdisclosure.  The efforts of taxpayers and advisors 
could be justified if the government were to collect additional revenue as a 
result of the information they provide.  But in the case of overdisclosure, where 
the tax strategies disclosed are consistent with both the letter and spirit of the 
underlying tax law, the government fails to collect additional revenue.   
III. WHY OVERDISCLOSURE?  INVESTIGATING THE SOURCES 
The discussion so far has provided concrete evidence that the threat of 
overdisclosure is real, but it has not addressed the fundamental question of why 
it occurs.  Without understanding the sources of overdisclosure, it would be 
difficult to consider and implement effective measures for preventing it. 
The overdisclosure response does not stem solely from any single feature 
of the tax law or tax administration.  Rather, it is the result of a number of factors, 
the relevance of which may vary depending on the type of taxpayer or advisor 
that is subject to the mandatory disclosure regime.  As this Part argues, current 
law contains numerous overdisclosure incentives for conservative types inclined 
to cooperate with the IRS, and for aggressive types that want to obstruct its 
search for tax shelter clues. 
                                                                                                                            
 139. See Michael Schler, Effects of Anti-Tax-Shelter Rules on Nonshelter Tax Practice, 109 
TAX NOTES 915 (2005) (“Every law firm in the country has been required to make an enormous 
effort to develop, and ensure ongoing compliance with, procedures relating to those transactions.”). 
 140. Weisbach, supra note 31, at 222.  Worse, it is theoretically possible that some taxpayers 
may actually engage in nonabusive transactions so that they can disclose participation in them to 
the IRS in addition to disclosing the use of much more questionable transactions.  The motivation 
of taxpayers and advisors who may purposely overdisclose nonabusive transactions to the IRS is 
discussed further in Part III.C, infra. 
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A. Different Attitudes Toward Tax Compliance 
Different taxpayers and advisors have different attitudes toward tax 
compliance.141 
Some may act cautiously, attempting to comply with the tax law to the 
fullest extent possible.  Cautious taxpayers are unlikely to claim risky tax posi-
tions on their tax returns, and certainly would not knowingly violate the tax 
law.  Similarly, there are tax advisors who fit this model.  Conservative advi-
sors avoid recycling standard opinions that do not fully consider the factual 
elements of particular clients’ transactions.  Rather, as Peter Canellos has 
written, these types of advisors view tax law as a practice area that is “interac-
tive, interpersonal, and calls for negotiating as well as analytical skills.”142 
Other types of taxpayers and advisors may view the IRS as an adversary 
and tax compliance as a game in which the objective is to pay the lowest 
amount of tax possible.  Aggressive taxpayers hope to win the audit lottery by 
escaping IRS detection, a gamble that has incredibly favorable odds for the 
taxpayer.143  These types of taxpayers turn to advisors who are known to apply 
hyper-literal readings of the Internal Revenue Code without regard to Congress’s 
intent or conflicting case law.  Canellos has distinguished tax shelter lawyers 
from the rest of the tax bar by describing them as of “a different breed, by 
experience, temperament, reputation, and calling.”144  What Canellos and others 
are saying is that certain taxpayers and advisors have a tendency to push the 
envelope by playing within the rules, but only by reading those rules as liter-
ally as possible.145 
The identity of a particular taxpayer or advisor as a conservative or aggres-
sive type may play a crucial part in the explanation of why overdisclosure occurs. 
Conservative taxpayers and advisors who are unlikely to claim risky tax 
positions also adopt a cautious reading of the tax shelter reporting rules.  
Indeed, these taxpayers and advisors may be so cautious that they would 
rather provide information about their transactions, even when they doubt 
such disclosure is required, rather than risk the consequences under current 
law that apply to acts of under- and nondisclosure.  While these types of 
                                                                                                                            
 141. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389 (2007) 
(describing identity benefits and tradeoffs of tax avoidance for different taxpayers); Alex Raskolnikov, 
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 
May 2009) (characterizing taxpayers as “gamers” versus “non-gamers”). 
 142. Canellos, supra note 20, at 55. 
 143. See Bankman, supra note 45, at 1782 (discussing audit lottery). 
 144. Canellos, supra note 20, at 56. 
 145. See Nanette Byrnes & Louis Lavelle, The Corporate Tax Game, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 2003, 
at 78 (discussing taxpayers’ “willingness to push the envelope”). 
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taxpayers and advisors provide unhelpful information to the IRS, they at least 
provide it in the spirit of compliance with the law. 
Aggressive taxpayers and advisors, on the other hand, often attempt to 
claim tax positions that are inconsistent with the purposes of the statutes on 
which they rely, but that do not raise red audit flags for the IRS.  These 
taxpayers and advisors are prototypical rational actors—for them, as the risk 
of an IRS audit increases, the expected benefit of an abusive tax position 
decreases.  Unlike conservative taxpayers and advisors, aggressive types may 
overdisclose nonabusive transactions and irrelevant information to the IRS 
because they expect to benefit from this behavior. 
B. Why Conservative Types Overdisclose 
When deciding whether they should report their ordinary, nonabusive 
transactions to the IRS, conservative taxpayers and advisors may lean in the 
direction of disclosure for three primary reasons: the tax shelter reporting 
rules are extremely broad, the IRS often fails to offer timely explanatory guid-
ance, and the penalties for failure to disclose are high. 
1. Broad Disclosure Requests 
The mandatory disclosure regime contains broad requests for informa-
tion about transactions that may bear typical tax shelter traits.  As the following 
examples illustrate, this breadth may cause conservative taxpayers and advi-
sors to provide the IRS with information that does not aid its search for 
abusive tax shelters. 
Substantial Similarity.  Even though the tax shelter reporting rules require 
disclosure of a transaction when it is “substantially similar” to a listed transac-
tion or a transaction of interest,146 the threshold for disclosure is much lower 
than the name of this concept suggests.  Under the regulations, taxpayers and 
advisors must disclose any transaction that is “expected to obtain the same or 
similar types of tax consequences and that is either factually similar or based 
on the same or similar tax strategy.”147  This definition thus sets the threshold 
for disclosure at whether the transactions or underlying tax strategies are 
merely “similar.”  As one practitioner has commented, “‘Substantially similar’ 
as defined in the regulations has nothing to do with substantially similar.”148 
                                                                                                                            
 146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4) (as amended in 2007). 
 147. Id. (emphasis added). 
 148. Terence F. Cuff, Los Angeles Practitioner Comments on Shelter Regs, 100 TAX NOTES 
1059, 1067 (2003). 
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The tax shelter reporting rules do not explicitly provide for any thresh-
old of reasonableness in defining substantial similarity.149  In the tax shelter 
disclosure context, the standard requires taxpayers and advisors to disclose 
participation in transactions that are merely “similar” to listed transactions or 
transactions of interest.150  The definition in the regulations makes no refer-
ence to the perception of a reasonable person at all.  Indeed, they require the 
term to be “broadly construed in favor of disclosure,”151 effectively eliminating 
a minimal threshold of reasonableness for taxpayers who choose to apply this 
instruction literally. 
When conservative taxpayers and advisors have provided the IRS with 
disclosure statements regarding nonabusive transactions in the past, their 
behavior may have been the result of broad application of the substantial 
similarity requirement.  The New York State Bar Association Tax Section, for 
example, reported that in response to the IRS’s designation of the interme-
diary corporation tax shelter as a listed transaction, many taxpayers disclosed 
their participation in routine sales of stock to tax-exempt entities because they 
were “concerned that their transactions might be viewed as ‘substantially 
similar’ to the one described in [the Notice].”152 
In spite of the threat of overdisclosure, the government has consistently 
endorsed an expansive interpretation of “substantial similarity.”  The regula-
tions defining the term explicitly require that “the term substantially similar 
must be broadly construed in favor of disclosure.”153  Responding to com-
plaints that the substantial similarity requirement creates uncertainty regarding 
whether certain nonabusive transactions must be disclosed, an IRS official 
commented in 2006 that as a result of the substantial similarity requirement, 
“If I were in your shoes and I wasn’t sure, I would disclose . . . .”154 
                                                                                                                            
 149. By contrast, courts in copyright infringement disputes involving such cases consider 
whether a defendant has produced a work “substantially similar” to that of the plaintiff by asking “whether 
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would 
conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff ’ s protectible expression by 
taking material of substance and value.”  Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 
672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982).  In other words, under this standard, judges seek to determine 
whether an ordinary reasonable person would find two works to be basically the same except for 
“minute differences.”  Country Kids ’N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 
1996).  Without this standard, in a copyright infringement case, as Judge Learned Hand once 
wrote, “a plagiarist would escape [liability] by immaterial variations.”  Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 150. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Letter From David S. Miller to Eric Solomon & Douglas Shulman, supra note 92, at 3. 
 153. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(c)(4). 
 154. Tandon, supra note 66, at 203. 
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No Abuse Necessary.  Current law also encourages conservative types to 
overdisclose by requiring disclosure of specified activities, whether or not they 
actually are abusive.  A core objective of the mandatory disclosure regime is 
to highlight for IRS agents the tax positions that may be the result of abusive tax 
planning.155  The tax shelter reporting rules do not absolve taxpayers from the 
disclosure obligation simply because a particular transaction does not result in 
understatement of tax liability, or is supported by a valid non-tax-related 
business purpose.156 
For example, if a taxpayer participates in a transaction that is identical 
to the contingent liability tax shelter—a listed transaction157—the taxpayer is 
obligated to disclose its participation even if it believes that the transaction 
served a real business purpose unrelated to tax avoidance.158  In fact, in the 
notice designating this particular tax strategy as a listed transaction, the IRS 
stated its view that “any business purposes taxpayers may assert for certain 
aspects of these transactions are far outweighed by the purpose to generate 
deductible losses for federal income tax purposes.”159  The IRS, thus, wants to 
see the details of the reportable transaction whether or not a taxpayer or 
advisor believes it constitutes abuse. 
The drawback to this strong stance is that cautious, conservative taxpay-
ers and advisors may feel an obligation to disclose any transactions that arguably 
fall within one of the required disclosure categories, even if they clearly lack 
abuse potential.  After all, if the transactions really are not abusive, disclosure 
poses little risk to the taxpayer.  Managers of hedge funds may have reported 
so many plain vanilla total return equity swaps because the managers broadly 
interpreted the IRS’s designation of the abusive notional principal contract 
tax shelter as a listed transaction.160  As commentators reported, there was 
little downside to disclosing these types of transactions, given their consistency 
with the tax law.161 
Retroactivity.  Conservative taxpayers may also be motivated to overdis-
close because the tax shelter reporting rules may apply to taxpayers’ transactions 
on a retroactive basis. 
If the IRS designates a particular strategy as a listed transaction after 
taxpayers have used it, taxpayers are nonetheless required to disclose 
                                                                                                                            
 155. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 19, pt. III.A.1, at 6 (describing the purposes 
of mandatory disclosure). 
 156. H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 373, 447 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). 
 157. I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 158. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2). 
 159. I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 160. See Kosnitzky, supra note 93, at 817. 
 161. See id. 
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participation in the strategy retroactively (as long as the applicable statute of 
limitations has not expired).162  Likewise, taxpayers must report transactions of 
interest retroactively.163 
Without a retroactivity provision, the mandatory disclosure regime 
would be so weak as to be nearly useless.  As has been discussed, the most 
popular tax shelters are those that are not explicitly prohibited by law or even 
subject to disclosure requirements.164  When it comes to abusive tax shelters, 
the IRS is constantly playing a cat-and-mouse game with taxpayers and tax 
shelter promoters.165  Retroactive disclosure requirements, consequently, are 
necessary for the IRS to receive disclosure statements regarding these transac-
tions from the taxpayers and advisors that first participated in them. 
Retroactive reporting rules, however, may cause conservative taxpayers to 
overdisclose.  An IRS announcement requiring taxpayers to disclose a listed 
transaction may cause a taxpayer to evaluate several years of transaction history 
to determine whether it has engaged in the transaction or one substantially 
similar to it.  Taxpayers have commented that the retroactivity feature results in 
record-keeping burdens, especially in the corporate context where tax directors 
may retire or resign before the IRS designates a particular transaction as subject 
to mandatory disclosure.166  Further, taxpayers must disclose participation in any 
such transaction within ninety calendar days after it becomes a listed transaction 
or transaction of interest.167  Conservative taxpayers, consequently, may disclose 
on a protective basis at the time they enter into transactions rather than wait 
for an IRS announcement requiring disclosure. 
2. Slow Explanatory Guidance 
Conservative taxpayers and advisors may also err on the side of overdis-
closure because the IRS is often slow to explain how the tax shelter reporting 
rules should be applied to transactions that, to taxpayers and advisors, 
appear nonabusive. 
When the IRS issues angel lists, it announces that certain clearly nonabu-
sive transactions and tax strategies are exempt from the mandatory disclosure 
regime.  The IRS can issue an angel list in the form of a notice that supersedes 
a prior notice, or as a stand-alone revenue procedure.  These lists are designed 
                                                                                                                            
 162. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2)(i). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 65, at 1940–42. 
 165. See generally id. 
 166. Cuff, supra note 148, at 1069–70. 
 167. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2)(i). 
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to alleviate uncertainty regarding disclosure and to prevent the IRS from 
receiving disclosures of obviously nonabusive tax strategies. 
While the IRS has issued angel lists for certain categories of reportable 
transactions,168 it has been slow or unwilling to clarify what types of transac-
tions are not substantially similar to a listed transaction or transaction of 
interest.  IRS officials have often resisted public calls for such guidance, citing 
a concern that taxpayers and advisors may exploit it to avoid disclosing 
abusive transactions.169 
In the rare cases in which the IRS has issued angel lists clarifying a 
notice that designated a particular tax strategy as a listed transaction, it has 
done so years after the original notice.  For example, after the IRS first 
required taxpayers to disclose participation in the notional principal contract 
tax shelter in 2002, taxpayers and advisors quickly questioned whether the 
IRS meant to capture plain vanilla total return equity swap transactions with 
its original notice.170  Despite this concern, the IRS did not issue a corrective 
notice exempting such nonabusive transactions from disclosure until nearly 
four years had elapsed.171 
As a result of the IRS’s reluctance to issue angel lists clarifying the scope 
of its disclosure requests, conservative taxpayers and advisors frequently dis-
close nonabusive transactions.  In the four years between the IRS’s original notice 
regarding notional principal contract tax shelters and its corrective guidance, 
taxpayers and advisors filed “tens of thousands of unnecessary disclosures” 
regarding total return equity swaps and other nonabusive transactions.172 
Further, because the IRS often allows so much time to pass before issu-
ing corrective guidance, some conservative taxpayers and advisors may adopt 
an overly cautious stance toward the mandatory disclosure regime.  These 
taxpayers and advisors may not change their disclosure behavior even after 
the IRS includes certain nonabusive transactions on an angel list. 
                                                                                                                            
 168. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2006-16, 2006-9 I.R.B. 538 (exempting nonabusive transactions 
from the requirement to disclose abusive notional principal contract tax shelters); Rev. Proc. 
2007-20, 2007-7 I.R.B. 517 (describing agreements with contractual protection that are not 
required to be disclosed); Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-50 I.R.B. 966 (describing loss transactions 
that are not required to be disclosed). 
 169. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 82, at 15.  In response to a question regarding the 
likelihood that the IRS would issue guidance regarding overdisclosure, Nicholas J. DeNovio, IRS 
Deputy Chief Counsel commented, “it is unlikely that the government would issue guidance based 
on what it observes about disclosures.”  Id. 
 170. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 171. The IRS issued the original notice on May 6, 2002 and the corrective guidance on 
February 13, 2006.  See I.R.S. Notice 2006-16, 2006-9 I.R.B. 538; see also infra note 247 and 
accompanying text. 
 172. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 130, at 12.   
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As an illustration, after the IRS issued Notice 2008-20 in 2008, which 
redefined an intermediary corporation tax shelter by using four objective fac-
tors rather than a more general description,173 some practitioners advised their 
clients to continue, if not increase, disclosure of nonabusive transactions.174  
They advised that, as a result of the corrective guidance, there are now 
“virtually ‘no excuses’ [for failing to file a disclosure statement] for stock 
transactions that happen to satisfy the [four] basic requirements of an interme-
diary transaction tax shelter.”175  The New York State Bar Association Tax 
Section echoed this sentiment, writing that “[i]n the face of this uncertainty, 
it has been suggested that a taxpayer should file a protective disclosure 
[regarding nonabusive transactions] or request a ruling . . . .”176  An IRS offi-
cial has acknowledged concern that taxpayers and advisors may respond to 
the new notice with “excessive reporting of transactions based on the uncertainty 
of the intentions of other parties to them.”177 
3. Fear of Nondisclosure Penalties 
The current penalties for failing to comply with the mandatory disclosure 
regime are severe.  As the following discussion explains, these penalties, when 
combined with broad reporting rules and limited explanatory guidance, have 
made overdisclosure a sensible strategy for conservative taxpayers and advisors. 
Monetary Penalties.  In 2004, in response to the growing mass-marketed 
tax shelter industry, Congress enacted new tax penalties for taxpayers and 
advisors that fail to file required disclosure statements.178 
                                                                                                                            
 173. I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730 (original notice describing intermediary corporation 
tax shelter). 
 174. Steven D. Bortnick, Beware the Inadvertent Tax Shelter, TAX UPDATE (Pepper Hamilton 
LLP) June 2008, at 4, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/pepper/publications. 
 175. Strasbaugh, supra note 94.  In addition, when the IRS has issued public announcements 
designating tax strategies as transactions of interest, it has not provided substantive legal analysis of the 
strategies described.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2007-72, 2007-36 I.R.B. 544 (no “Analysis” section). 
 176. Letter From David S. Miller to Eric Solomon & Douglas Shulman, supra note 92. 
 177. Sam Young, No Immediate Relief From ‘Midco’ Transaction Notice, 119 TAX NOTES 
1304, 1304 (2008).  Shortly before this Article was published, the IRS attempted to respond to 
this concern by issuing a revised notice, I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299, containing 
an additional factor to its definition of the intermediary corporation tax shelter.  The revised 
Notice incorporates into the definition the existence of a “plan” to avoid federal income tax on 
the disposition of appreciated assets, and describes ways in which a taxpayer “knows or has reason 
to know the transaction is structured to effectuate the Plan.”  I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 
I.R.B. 1299, 1300.  This Notice is further discussed in Part IV.A, infra. 
 178. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 
4520, THE “AMERICAN JOBS CREATION ACT OF 2004” 150 (Comm. Print 2004) (discussing 
reasons for penalties). 
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For taxpayers, the penalty for failing to report a listed transaction is 
$100,000, in the case of individuals,179 and $200,000, in the case of corpora-
tions,180 for each act of nondisclosure.  These penalties are reduced to $10,000 
for individuals181 and $50,000 for corporations182 in the case of nondisclosure 
of any other type of reportable transaction.  The monetary penalties effectively 
apply on a strict liability basis and “without regard to whether the transaction 
ultimately results in an understatement of tax.”183  The ability of the IRS to 
waive these penalties is also subject to record-keeping requirements and poten-
tial oversight by Congress.184 
Further, for taxpayers who fail to disclose any type of reportable transac-
tion, a significant purpose of which is tax avoidance, the penalties that may 
apply to the understatement of tax increase from 20 percent to 30 percent.185 
The tax law also imposes high monetary penalties on advisors that fail to 
comply with the mandatory disclosure regime.  If an advisor does not file a disclo-
sure statement regarding a listed transaction, the advisor is subject to a monetary 
penalty of $200,000 or 50 percent of the gross income it earned for providing 
advice regarding the transaction, whichever is greater.186  In addition, if a 
material advisor fails to provide a required tax shelter investor list to the IRS 
within twenty days of the IRS’s request, the advisor is fined $10,000 per day 
until the IRS receives the list.187 
Conservative taxpayers and advisors may feel obligated to disclose 
nonabusive transactions as a result of the monetary penalties that apply to acts of 
nondisclosure.  A corporate tax director may be concerned that a routine busi-
ness restructuring involving liabilities and corporate subsidiaries could have a 
remote chance of being considered substantially similar to a listed transaction.188  
Filing a disclosure statement with the IRS guarantees that the corporation is 
protected against the high penalties.189 
                                                                                                                            
 179. I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
 180. Id. § 6707A(b)(2)(B). 
 181. Id. § 6707A(b)(1)(A). 
 182. Id. § 6707A(b)(1)(B). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 373 (2004) (Conf. Rep.). 
 184. I.R.C. § 6707A(d)(3). 
 185. Id. § 6662A(c) (2006). 
 186. Id. § 6707(b)(2). 
 187. Id. § 6708(a)(1) (2006). 
 188. I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730 (contingent liability tax shelter). 
 189. Analogous responses have occurred in other areas of the law.  For example, some torts 
scholars have argued that the threat of liability for failure to provide consumers with adequate 
warning labels on products “induces manufacturers to provide extensive and often excessive 
disclosure at the cost of sacrificing clarity and salience for vital information.”  Howard Latin, 
“Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1293 (1994). 
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Likewise, conservative tax advisors may file reportable transaction dis-
closure statements in similar situations, especially if the client has done so.  
And the threat of a never-ending $10,000-a-day penalty for tax advisors190 
who fail to provide complete tax shelter investor lists to the IRS upon request 
may also motivate these advisors to maintain more records than necessary. 
Shaming Penalties.  Certain taxpayers may also overdisclose out of fear of 
reputational harm that may result from failing to comply with the mandatory 
disclosure regime. 
The government is generally prohibited from publicly disclosing informa-
tion about particular tax returns, including any penalties paid.191  However, 
Congress enacted legislation in 2004 that requires large corporate taxpayers 
to announce any nondisclosure penalties they have paid to the IRS in their 
public filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.192  The statute is 
consistent with typical government shaming mechanisms that publicly highlight 
an offender’s bad act, to punish the offender and deter others.193 
A shaming sanction for failure to disclose information to the IRS may 
cause some conservative tax directors to fear reputational harm for their 
corporations or for themselves.  As opposed to publicity that a corporation’s 
managers have claimed aggressive tax positions that are not explicitly prohib-
ited,194 public reports that a corporation’s managers have simply failed to provide 
requested information to the IRS could send a negative signal to members of 
the corporation’s community.  Corporate managers may worry that investors 
and potential business partners could interpret news of a nondisclosure penalty 
as reflecting the level of the corporation’s managers’ openness and honesty. 
In response to these sanctions, tax directors, lawyers, and accountants 
have engaged in numerous public discussions on procedures that corporations 
should adopt to ensure they comply with the IRS’s disclosure requirements.195  
The most obvious response, they often conclude, is that when in doubt, overdis-
closure minimizes reputational risk for their corporations. 
                                                                                                                            
 190. I.R.C. § 6708(a)(1). 
 191. See id. § 6103 (2006). 
 192. Id. § 6707A(e) (2006). 
 193. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1880, 1883 (1991); James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 
1055, 1063–68 (1998). 
 194. See Blank, supra note 2. 
 195. See, e.g., Christian M. McBurney, Public Companies Need to Identify Reportable Transactions to 
Avoid SEC Disclosure and IRS Penalties, 103 J. TAX’N 5 (2005) (outlining procedures that tax directors 
should adopt to avoid disclosure failures); Herbert N. Beller, The New Penalty Regime: Proceed With 
Caution!, 106 TAX NOTES 311 (2005) (describing the significance of shaming sanctions for nondisclosure). 
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C. Why Aggressive Types Overdisclose 
While conservative types may overdisclose information to the IRS out of 
fear of the consequences of nondisclosure, aggressive types may engage in this 
behavior for very different reasons.  Aggressive taxpayers, the type that claim 
risky tax positions exploiting ambiguities in the tax law, and their aggressive 
advisors may embrace overdisclosure as an affirmative strategy for avoiding 
detection by the IRS.  Just like typical tax shelter transactions, intentional acts 
of overdisclosure are “perfectly legal.”196  In addition, public statements from 
IRS officials regarding the difficulty that overdisclosure has caused the IRS signals 
to aggressive types that it is likely an effective detection avoidance strategy. 
1. Detection Avoidance 
Overdisclosure may enable aggressive taxpayers and advisors to conceal 
their questionable tax strategies without risking high nondisclosure penalties. 
In terms of substantive tax planning, a key objective for aggressive taxpayers 
is to find ways to avoid paying taxes without raising red flags for IRS auditors. 
As Alex Raskolnikov has described, an aggressive taxpayer often chooses 
a tax avoidance strategy that does not cause items on her tax return to vary 
dramatically from those on her prior tax returns or from those on the tax 
returns of other taxpayers who fit her profile.197  Applying Raskolnikov’s explana-
tion, a suburban dentist will probably not attempt to claim a $100 tax loss 
attributable to almond farming, a deduction she has never claimed before 
and attributable to an activity in which she has little or no actual involvement.198  
Rather, the dentist is more likely to claim $100 of phony charitable deductions 
if she also claims $1000 of legitimate charitable deductions on her tax return 
and has done so for years.199  The latter strategy would probably seem more attrac-
tive to the dentist because she believes that the chances of the IRS detecting 
the phony $100 charitable deduction, which is mixed in with the legitimate 
$1000 of charitable deductions, are much lower than the chances of the IRS 
detecting the $100 of phony almond farm deductions.200 
Overdisclosure enables aggressive taxpayers to avoid detection by the IRS 
using different means.  Rather than burying a small illegitimate deduction on 
the same line as a larger legitimate deduction on its tax return, overdisclosure 
                                                                                                                            
 196. JOHNSTON, supra note 28. 
 197. Raskolnikov, supra note 13, at 572. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
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allows an aggressive taxpayer to provide the IRS with pure information about 
nonabusive transactions.  When the aggressive taxpayer simultaneously files a 
disclosure statement regarding a truly abusive tax strategy, IRS may be so 
distracted by the filings regarding nonabusive transactions that it will not 
question the strategy. 
As a result, an aggressive taxpayer may conclude that with the overdisclo-
sure technique, the overall expected utility of engaging in the abusive transaction 
will not be any lower than the expected utility would be in the absence of 
disclosure.201  And overdisclosure will allow the aggressive taxpayer to escape 
the high monetary and non-monetary penalties for failure to disclose. 
Imagine that an aggressive tax director at a large corporation, acting on 
advice purchased from an accountant, implements a highly complex tax shel-
ter strategy unknown to the IRS that allows his corporation to avoid millions 
in tax liability.  The accountant promises the tax director to refund 50 percent 
of his fee if the IRS successfully challenges the tax treatment.  The refund feature 
subjects this tax shelter to “contractual protection,” so the tax director is 
required to disclose the corporation’s use of it to the IRS.202 
The tax director can avoid the nondisclosure penalties by filing a report-
able transaction statement regarding this tax shelter strategy with the IRS.  
But at the same time, the tax director can also file unnecessary reportable 
transaction statements regarding any nonabusive transactions for which the 
corporation was entitled to a refund of fees by a tax advisor.  The technical 
justification for the aggressive tax director’s affirmative overdisclosure is that 
the tax shelter reporting rules cast a wide net when describing transactions 
with contractual protection.203  If the rules are applied broadly, as one practi-
tioner has commented, “[p]ractically any transaction has the potential of a 
refund of fees or a legal claim against the professionals if the tax work is found 
to be below prevailing standards.”204 
There are several reasons why the aggressive tax director in this example 
may believe overdisclosure will enable him to report the abusive tax shelter 
without raising a red flag for the IRS. 
The tax director may believe that by providing so much information 
about real transactions, there will only be a small chance that the IRS will 
                                                                                                                            
 201. The reason for this result is that the aggressive taxpayer may believe that if he engages 
in overdisclosure, the chance the IRS will successfully detect and challenge a dubious tax position 
will not increase significantly, or at all, over the chance of IRS detection in the absence of filing 
of the required reportable transaction disclosure statement.  I thank Sarah Lawsky for helpful 
discussions regarding this point. 
 202. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(4) (as amended in 2007). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Cuff, supra note 148, at 1067. 
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focus on the one disclosure statement regarding the abusive tax strategy.  The 
IRS may instead seek additional information about one of the nonabusive 
transactions.  Just as the leprechaun hides his gold beneath a ragwort plant 
adorned with a red ribbon among hundreds of other ragwort plants adorned 
with red ribbons,205 the tax director may use the overdisclosure technique to 
obscure truly questionable transactions from view. 
As has been discussed, overdisclosure may become the norm in response 
to a particular reportable transaction requirement because many conservative 
tax directors apply an overly cautious reading of the tax shelter reporting 
rules.206  An aggressive tax director can essentially piggyback on the behavior 
of conservative tax directors by engaging in overdisclosure as well.  By overdis-
closing in order to hide an abusive tax shelter, the aggressive tax director’s 
behavior may resemble that of conservative types, reducing the probability 
that the IRS will focus on the aggressive tax director’s filings. 
The aggressive tax director may also believe that overdisclosure is an 
effective detection avoidance strategy because of the statute of limitations.  If 
a taxpayer fails to disclose a listed transaction, the statute of limitations 
remains open.207  But if the aggressive tax director files a disclosure statement 
regarding the abusive tax strategy, along with many disclosures of nonabusive 
transactions, the statute of limitations clock on the abusive strategy begins to 
tick.  It may expire within as little time as three years from the filing of the 
corporation’s tax return.208  Once the statute of limitations clock stops, absent 
fraud or another special exception, the IRS will not be able to challenge tax 
benefits the corporation has claimed using the abusive tax shelter.209 
Aggressive advisors may also pursue a strategy of intentional overdisclo-
sure, but for slightly different reasons than aggressive taxpayers.  The aggressive 
advisor, such as the accountant in the example above, wants to sell his tax 
shelter product to as many taxpayers as possible before the IRS detects the strat-
egy and designates it as a listed transaction.210  Again, such notices chill the 
market for that particular abusive tax shelter.  By overdisclosing, the advisor 
                                                                                                                            
 205. ANNA FRANKLIN, THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF FAIRIES 155 (Paper Tiger, 
2005).  In the legend, a farmer demands that a leprechaun reveal the location of his gold.  When 
the leprechaun shows the farmer the ragwort plant under which he has buried the gold, the farmer ties a 
red ribbon to it while he leaves to find a shovel.  When the farmer returns, he discovers that the 
leprechaun has tied red ribbons to every ragwort plant in the field.  Id.  I thank Larry Zelenak for 
suggesting this analogy. 
 206. See supra notes 146–167 and accompanying text. 
 207. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (2006). 
 208. Id. § 6501(a). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See Bankman, supra note 45, at 1781–82. 
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avoids high penalties for failure to disclose, and may also reduce the chance of 
the IRS detecting the abusive tax strategy, enabling him to continue selling it. 
2. It’s “Perfectly Legal” 
In light of the potential benefits of overdisclosure for aggressive taxpayers 
and advisors, these types may be especially drawn to the “it’s perfectly legal” 
response to the mandatory disclosure regime because the law neither explicitly 
nor implicitly prohibits it. 
No Disclosure Limits.  The law contains very few limits on disclosure that 
would prevent an aggressive taxpayer or advisor from intentionally reporting 
participation in nonabusive transactions. 
Taxpayers and advisors can file as many reportable transaction disclosure 
statements as they want to file.211  Aggressive types may take advantage of 
the protective disclosure filing mechanism, which allows them to file disclosure 
statements whenever they could plausibly claim to be unsure whether a particu-
lar transaction must be disclosed.212  Further, the regulations now require 
protective disclosure statements to include the same information that they 
would include on a nonprotective disclosure statement.213  Aggressive taxpayers 
and advisors can exploit this procedure, by filing detailed disclosure statements 
that describe nonabusive transactions with a tenuous basis for disclosure. 
Likewise, there is no limit on the number of words or pages a taxpayer or 
advisor may use to describe a reportable transaction when filing a disclosure 
statement with the IRS.  The only limit on the description of the transaction 
is that it must explain the transaction “in sufficient detail for the IRS to be 
able to understand the tax structure of the reportable transaction.”214  Aggressive 
types can interpret the term “sufficient detail” as requiring taxpayers and 
advisors to provide the IRS with more rather than less information about a 
transaction, especially when considering other regulations that instruct taxpay-
ers and advisors to disclose excess information when in doubt. 
While there are more restrictions on the disclosure practice of advisors 
than taxpayers, they do not limit advisors’ ability to pursue many forms of 
overdisclosure.  For example, advisors are no longer permitted to deliver an 
unorganized box of documents to the IRS in response to a tax shelter investor 
request, and under current law, an index and a particular IRS form must accom-
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pany the documents.215  Yet despite these rules, advisors may still intentionally 
disclose information regarding taxpayers and transactions that do not reveal 
abuse as long as they do so using the IRS form and in an organized fashion. 
Lack of Authority.  The tax law provides that every taxpayer is required 
to “carefully prepare his return and set forth fully and clearly the information 
required to be included therein.”216  In spite of this provision, an aggressive 
taxpayer may still file as many disclosure statements regarding nonabusive 
transactions as possible, so long as there is some basis for considering these trans-
actions to be subject to the reportable transaction rules.  The regulation’s 
statement of the taxpayer’s filing obligation may not change the incentive for 
an aggressive taxpayer to include many unnecessary details in a description of 
a reportable transaction as long as the taxpayer presents them “clearly.”217 
It is also unlikely that excessive reporting of nonabusive transactions 
and information irrelevant to tax shelter detection would constitute fraud for 
tax purposes.  As Congress first defined the term in 1934, “fraud” for tax 
purposes means “fraud with intent to evade tax.”218  Fraud usually involves 
explicit lying to the IRS, such as where taxpayers claim personal exemptions 
for children that do not exist or taxable losses for business expenses never 
incurred.219  When aggressive types file unnecessary disclosure statements, on 
the other hand, they describe transactions and events that have actually 
occurred.  As the author of the leading tax procedure treatise commented on 
the distinction between fraud and other types of behavior, 
[T]he deception and misleading conduct characteristic of fraud distin-
guishes fraud from tax avoidance devices.  Both may result in 
underpayments in tax, but tax avoidance is characterized by disclosure 
of transactions that are, in fact, what they appear to be, for example, a 
sale that is not a sham as a matter of fact, or a sale that takes place on 
the date stated.220 
Further, it is unlikely that the IRS could prove the necessary intent standard 
by clear and convincing evidence.  The tax shelter reporting rules, after all, 
state that key disclosure requirements “must be broadly construed in favor 
of disclosure.”221 
                                                                                                                            
 215. I.R.S. Form 13976 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f13976.pdf. 
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No Penalties.  Finally, aggressive taxpayers may excessively report nonabu-
sive transactions because the law contains no explicit monetary penalties for 
overdisclosure.  As the discussion in Part II.B.3 indicates, since 2004, the law 
has contained extensive monetary and non-monetary penalties for taxpayers 
that fail to disclose their participation in reportable transactions.222  However, 
the tax law fails to provide aggressive types with an explicit disincentive for 
adopting an affirmative strategy of overdisclosure. 
3. Awareness 
Last, aggressive types may overdisclose as a result of the IRS’s own pub-
licity of the difficulties overdisclosure has caused the Service. 
Government officials have frequently discussed the overdisclosure prob-
lem in presentations at meetings of corporate tax directors, bar associations, 
and other public events, pleading publicly with those in attendance to reduce 
their overdisclosure of ordinary business transactions.223  For example, at a 
2004 meeting of the Tax Executives Institute, an IRS official implored the 
attendees, “We ask you not to contort the regs regarding disclosure . . . . We don’t 
think it is necessary to contort the regs for overdisclosure of routine issues.”224  
Such public statements alert aggressive taxpayers and advisors that overdisclosure 
may be an effective technique for avoiding IRS detection of questionable tax 
positions, and that the IRS has little means to prevent the response other 
than public pleas. 
In addition, when the IRS releases an angel list or corrective guidance to 
clarify the tax shelter reporting rules, it reveals publicly the specific activities 
about which the IRS does not want to receive information.  For aggressive 
types, this guidance may serve as a playbook of the transactions they could 
purposely disclose in order to distract the IRS.  For example, after the IRS 
announced in 2006 that total return equity swaps were no longer subject to 
mandatory disclosure requirements, it subsequently reported on its website 
and in a public notice that “[t]he Service has continued to receive unneces-
sary disclosures from taxpayers meeting the exceptions [described in the IRS’s 
                                                                                                                            
 222. See supra notes 179–184 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra note 79. 
 224. Bennett, supra note 82, at 15 (quoting Nicholas J. DeNovio, IRS Deputy Chief 
Counsel).  At a similar meeting in 2006, another IRS official commented to the audience, “there 
are going to be instances where [disclosure] isn’t a gray area and it isn’t a judgment call, and we would ask 
that practitioners thoughtfully analyze the situation and come to the appropriate conclusion.”  
Tandon, supra note 66, at 203 (quoting Christopher B. Sterner, Division Counsel, IRS Large and 
Midsize Business Division). 
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notice].”225  Though we may not know exactly what motivated the taxpayers 
and advisors that filed these unnecessary disclosures, some may have been 
filed by aggressive types as a strategy for hiding abusive tax planning. 
IV. CAN OVERDISCLOSURE BE OVERCOME?  REFORM POSSIBILITIES 
Despite the predictable nature of overdisclosure and the threats it poses 
to tax administration, neither the substantive tax law nor the IRS has adopted 
an effective strategy for preventing it. 
Several commentators have concluded that overdisclosure is a necessary 
evil resulting from rules that impose high penalties for failing to disclose 
information or, alternatively, increase the possibility of the IRS challenging 
their tax positions if they do disclose.226  According to this view, overdis-
closure is a problem the tax law cannot address preemptively and that the 
IRS should deal with, as needed, reactively.227 
Yet the IRS’s past attempts to reduce overdisclosure have been inade-
quate.  By refusing to implement an overdisclosure policy that taxpayers and 
advisors can apply on an ex ante basis, the IRS has encouraged them to 
overdisclose by applying the tax shelter reporting rules broadly.228  When the 
IRS has eventually issued corrective guidance, often years after the original 
rules evoked an overdisclosure response, the guidance may not have had its 
intended effect.229  And public pleas from IRS officials that taxpayers and 
advisors not “contort the regs for overdisclosure of routine issues”230 appear to 
have often fallen on deaf ears. 
Further, the most obvious way to alleviate the overdisclosure response—
repeal of the high nondisclosure penalties—would likely cause taxpayers and 
advisors to revert to the general disclosure behavior they exhibited before 
2004—minimal to no disclosure.231 
Without the threat of nondisclosure penalties, conservative types would 
limit their disclosure to tax positions they believe may actually result in an 
                                                                                                                            
 225. Internal Revenue Service, Explanation of Notice 2006-16—Impact on Required Disclosures 
(June 5, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/businesses/article/0,,id=158628,00.html. 
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IRS challenge on substantive legal grounds.  The reason for this change in 
behavior is that without nondisclosure penalties, the only consequence of 
failing to disclose a transaction would be the loss of a defense to accuracy 
penalties.  If the IRS were to challenge a nondisclosed tax position and apply an 
accuracy penalty, the taxpayer would not be able to use disclosure as a way to 
establish a reasonable cause or good faith defense.232  Because conservative 
taxpayers and advisors do not participate in tax planning that they consider 
likely to generate a challenge from the IRS, they would probably file very few, 
if any, reportable transaction disclosure statements. 
For aggressive taxpayers, the repeal of the nondisclosure penalties would 
eliminate any incentive to file reportable transaction disclosure statements 
with the IRS.  The primary reason why aggressive taxpayers participate in the 
mandatory disclosure regime is, as I have argued, to escape the high nondis-
closure penalties while continuing to hide their abusive tax shelters.233  If the 
nondisclosure penalties were repealed, an aggressive type would have no 
motivation to disclose; after all, the best strategy for avoiding IRS detection 
of an abusive tax shelter is to disclose nothing.  And without the overdis-
closure culture that conservative types have created due to their extreme 
caution, an aggressive type would view disclosure as an obvious way to attract 
scrutiny from the IRS.234 
Rather than advocate a single “silver bullet” solution to a multi-layered 
problem, I offer three proposals that could be implemented together as an 
overall strategy to reduce overdisclosure: (a) use anticipatory angel lists when 
the IRS designates new listed transactions, (b) enact targeted monetary penal-
ties for certain acts of overdisclosure, and (c) require business taxpayers to file 
copies of certain non-tax documentation describing the disclosed transactions 
that the taxpayers prepared for actors other than the IRS. 
A. Anticipatory Angel Lists 
A significant contributing factor to the overdisclosure response is the 
government’s reluctance to inform taxpayers and advisors explicitly that they 
should not disclose participation in certain nonabusive activities, especially 
                                                                                                                            
 232. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (d) (2006) (setting forth reasonable cause as a defense to accuracy penalty 
equal to 20 percent of the understatement of tax). 
 233. See supra notes 196–210 and accompanying text. 
 234. Further, without the nondisclosure penalties, the IRS would have little authority under 
other provisions of the tax law to deter taxpayers and advisors from ignoring the obligation to 
disclose participation in reportable transactions.  See, e.g., Germantown Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 
309 U.S. 304 (1940) (holding that a wrong form filed was still considered a tax return for purposes 
of statute of limitations). 
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in cases involving listed transactions.235  When the IRS designates a tax strategy 
as a listed transaction, it generally uses a revenue ruling or notice to focus 
attention on the details of the tax strategy at issue.236  To date, the IRS has 
designated thirty-four separate tax strategies as listed transactions and main-
tains the original designation announcements on its website.237  None of these 
announcements contains specific instructions from the IRS regarding tax 
strategies that are explicitly exempted from the listed transaction designation.238   
In contrast to its current approach, the IRS could preempt overdisclosure 
by incorporating angel lists into its listed transaction announcements. 
When it designates a tax strategy as a listed transaction, the IRS could 
also supply taxpayers with a list of similar transactions that are, in the IRS’s 
view, nonabusive.  The government has already commented that it may use 
the transaction-of-interest category as a way to solicit feedback from taxpay-
ers and advisors before announcing a listed transaction.239  This approach 
could supply information not only about the abusive tax strategy at issue, but 
also about nonabusive transactions that a listed transaction notice could 
unintentionally cover. 
Under this proposal, if the IRS eventually designates the tax strategy as a 
listed transaction, it would include in its announcement an angel list of clearly 
nonabusive transactions, exempting them from the mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  Each announcement of a new listed transaction could include a 
section entitled “Transactions Not Substantially Similar” that describes these 
nonabusive transactions.  Because the IRS would include these angel lists in 
the designation of a listed strategy initially, rather than years later through 
corrective guidance, the angel lists can be characterized as anticipatory. 
1. Rationale 
Anticipatory angel lists could enhance the IRS’s tax shelter detection efforts 
by adding more precision to disclosure requests, preempting the uncertainty that 
typically follows the designation of a new listed transaction, and encouraging 
cooperation between conservative taxpayers and advisors and the IRS. 
                                                                                                                            
 235. See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
 236. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 237. IRS, Recognized Abusive and Listed Transactions (May 28, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/ 
businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html. 
 238. See id. 
 239. T.D. 9350, 2007-38 I.R.B. 607, 608 (“IRS and Treasury Department may choose to 
publish advance notice and request comments”). 
1674 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1629 (2009) 
 
 
Focused Disclosure Requests.  Because anticipatory angel lists would describe 
specific, clearly nonabusive transactions that need not be disclosed, they would 
be unlikely to lead to underdisclosure or nondisclosure in the same manner as 
other possible exceptions. 
In the past, when the IRS publicly described the details of a new listed 
transaction, it avoided stating that the transaction “fails to serve a significant 
business purpose other than tax avoidance.”240  The probable rationale for this 
and similar omissions is that if the IRS were to include them, the scope of the 
listed transaction designation could effectively be narrowed.  Clever taxpayers 
and advisors, seeking to avoid disclosure, could manufacture a nominal 
business purpose or find ways to disclaim a tax avoidance plan. 
By contrast, anticipatory angel lists could focus the IRS’s listed transac-
tion designation by identifying nonabusive transactions that would not be 
subject to mandatory disclosure.  The IRS has issued similar angel lists for 
other categories of reportable transactions, such as loss transactions, in antici-
pation of excessive reporting.241  When the IRS announced that taxpayers 
must disclose transactions that generate significant tax losses, for example, 
the IRS also announced that if a taxpayer claims a tax-deductible loss due to 
“fire, storm, shipwreck or other casualty,” it is not required to file a reportable 
transaction disclosure statement.242  The reason for the disclosure exception 
here is clear: The IRS considers it unlikely that a taxpayer would purposely 
incorporate a costly fire or sinking ship into a transaction simply to avoid fed-
eral income tax.  IRS officials have not reported a decrease in the disclosure 
of potentially abusive tax strategies as a result of this exemption.243 
Surprisingly, the IRS has failed to provide comparable anticipatory angel 
lists when designating listed transactions.244  This is particularly odd given 
that the listed transaction category, unlike loss transactions and confidential 
transactions, is subject to the extremely broad “substantial similarity” stan-
dard.245  As a result, anticipatory angel lists would significantly shift the IRS’s 
                                                                                                                            
 240. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2008-20, 2008-6 I.R.B. 406 (avoiding use of this language in describing 
intermediary corporation tax shelters). 
 241. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-50 I.R.B. 966; Rev. Proc. 2007-20, 2007-7 I.R.B. 517 
(describing certain types of agreements with contractual protection that are not required to be disclosed). 
 242. Rev. Proc. 2004-66, 2004-50 I.R.B. 966-67 (describing certain types of loss transactions 
that are not required to be disclosed). 
 243. Id.  For an illustration of a similar angel list, see Rev. Proc. 2007-20, 2007-7 I.R.B. 517 
(describing certain types of agreements with contractual protection that are not required to be disclosed). 
 244. See infra note 251. 
 245. See supra notes 146–154 and accompanying text.  Shortly before this Article was published, 
the IRS released a revised Notice describing the components of an intermediary corporation tax shelter, 
I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299.  The Notice includes three “safeharbor” transactions that 
do not qualify as intermediary corporation tax shelters.  Id.  While the Notice is certainly a step in the 
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approach to designating new listed transactions.  If conservative taxpayers 
and advisors were to adhere to the new anticipatory angel lists, the IRS could 
increase the speed with which it detects real abuse. 
Reduced Corrective Guidance.  Anticipatory angel lists may also lessen 
the amount of corrective guidance the IRS issues to clarify its original desig-
nations of listed transactions.  As Part III demonstrated, a frequent response 
to new listed transactions is that taxpayers and advisors immediately disclose 
nonabusive transactions they deem substantially similar to those described in 
the announcements.246  The IRS has periodically issued corrective guidance 
exempting nonabusive transactions from mandatory disclosure, though 
often years after its original announcement (and in some cases not at all).247  
Sometimes the corrective guidance has increased uncertainty among taxpay-
ers and advisors, and has failed to dissuade them from disclosing the 
nonabusive activities at issue.248  By including anticipatory angel lists in initial 
designations of listed transactions, the IRS may avoid the need to issue such 
corrective guidance in the future.  As a result, the IRS could prevent years from 
elapsing after its initial designation of a listed transaction during which taxpayer 
and advisor confusion over what must be disclosed festers. 
Cooperative Approach.  A final benefit of anticipatory angel lists is that 
they may reduce resistance to the government’s new disclosure initiatives.  
Taxpayers and advisors who do not participate in abusive tax planning but 
nonetheless feel burdened by the tax shelter reporting rules often criticize the 
IRS’s attempts to designate new listed transactions or otherwise expand the scope 
of the tax shelter reporting rules.249  As a result, the Treasury and IRS often 
make concessions to appease this constituency, even though these conces-
sions may allow some abusive tax planning to escape detection.  By not only 
seeking comments before designating new listed transactions, but also acting 
on them through the use of anticipatory angel lists, the IRS could mollify 
some of the hostility toward the mandatory disclosure regime.250 
                                                                                                                            
right direction, it was issued seven years after the IRS’s original designation of the intermediary 
corporation tax shelter as a listed transaction.  See I.R.S. Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730. 
 246. See, e.g., supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 249. For example, when the Treasury announced its intention to create a new category of 
reportable transactions, “transactions of interest,” conservative taxpayers and advisors protested.  
TAX SECTION, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 63, at 4–9.   
 250. The proposal would respond to a frequent request from taxpayers and advisors for 
explanatory guidance.  See, e.g., Stratton, supra note 119, at 20 (quoting a practitioner at an IRS 
presentation as commenting, “Feedback on what the IRS doesn’t need would be helpful”). 
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2. Potential Objections 
The principal potential objections to the use of anticipatory angel lists 
are that they may provide an incentive for taxpayers and advisors to avoid 
disclosure, unduly tie the IRS’s hands, and inform aggressive types of the trans-
actions that disrupt the IRS’s detection efforts.  Each of these potential objections 
is addressed below. 
Another Disclosure Loophole.  A likely objection to the proposed use of 
anticipatory angel lists is that it could reduce the willingness of taxpayers and 
advisors to err on the side of disclosure when considering whether questionable 
tax strategies are reportable transactions.  Dean David Schizer, for instance, 
has criticized the IRS’s use of angel lists in the past, asserting that “taxpayers 
analogize to transactions on the list in order to conclude that they do not 
have to disclose transactions that, in light of the purposes of the regime, 
should be disclosed.”251 
There are two reasons why the disclosure loophole concern does not 
outweigh the benefits of the proposed use of anticipatory angel lists. 
First, if a court or the IRS determined that a taxpayer or advisor had 
abused the angel list to avoid disclosing participation in a questionable transac-
tion, the taxpayer or advisor would be considered as having failed to disclose 
participation in a listed transaction.  Thus, that taxpayer or advisor would be 
subject to the most severe penalties in the mandatory disclosure regime.252  
The angel lists that Schizer has criticized, by contrast, involved other categories 
of reportable transactions for which the penalty for nondisclosure is significantly 
lower.253  Taxpayers and advisors, even aggressive ones, may thus not be willing 
to exploit anticipatory angel lists because of the much higher penalties that result 
from a determination of failure to disclose participation in a listed transaction. 
Second, the IRS would presumably craft the angel lists as narrowly as 
possible, describing included transactions with great specificity and only 
including clearly nonabusive transactions.  Further, no “substantial similarity” 
standard should apply to the anticipatory angel lists.  As a result, taxpayers 
and advisors would still have to disclose participation in any transactions not 
exactly like those on the anticipatory angel list.  A taxpayer seeking to rely 
on an angel list as a basis for nondisclosure would, in other words, have to 
engage in a transaction exactly like one on the list. 
                                                                                                                            
 251. David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 358 n.64 (2006). 
 252. See I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2)(B) (2006) ($200,000 penalty for corporations). 
 253. See id. § 6707A(b)(1)(B) ($50,000 penalty for corporations). 
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Tying the IRS’s Hands.  Another potential objection is that the proposal 
would effectively tie the IRS’s hands by forcing it to commit up-front to a list 
of exemptions.  Opponents of anticipatory angel lists could argue that the 
IRS does not necessarily know at the time when it designates a tax strategy as 
a listed transaction what variations of that strategy are abusive or nonabu-
sive.254  It can reach such conclusions only after careful review.  The status 
quo approach, they might argue, provides the IRS with flexibility to deter-
mine what changes, if any, it should make to its original designation of a 
listed transaction. 
But anticipatory angel lists would not prevent the IRS from issuing cor-
rective guidance in the future.  If the IRS designates a listed transaction and 
includes an anticipatory angel list, but subsequently determines that a transaction 
on the angel list really should be disclosed, or, alternatively, determines that a 
nonabusive transaction should have been included on the angel list, the IRS 
can simply issue corrective guidance.255  The proposal should limit the need 
for such corrective guidance, especially considering that the IRS would have 
consulted with taxpayers and advisors regarding transactions for the angel list 
before designating a new listed transaction; but the proposal certainly does 
not prohibit such guidance. 
Playbook for Aggressive Types.  An important potential objection to the 
proposed anticipatory angel lists is that they may help aggressive taxpayers 
and advisors that seek to overdisclose participation in nonabusive transac-
tions as a detection avoidance strategy.  As Part III discussed, aggressive types 
may attempt to hide disclosure of an actual abusive tax strategy by also 
disclosing transactions very similar to those in the IRS’s corrective guidance 
and angel lists—disclosures that, as the IRS itself has indicated, impede the 
IRS’s detection efforts.256  The IRS’s use of anticipatory angel lists, which 
would describe potentially distracting nonabusive transactions earlier rather 
than later, thus might offer aggressive types a head start on overdisclosure.257 
In order to ameliorate this potentially serious problem while still reduc-
ing overdisclosure, the law should contain some disincentive for aggressive 
taxpayers to disclose participation in transactions that the IRS has included 
                                                                                                                            
 254. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 251, at 358. 
 255. See supra notes 168–171 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 257. For example, although I.R.S. Notice 2008-111, 2008-51 I.R.B. 1299, contains three 
“safeharbor” transactions that do not qualify as intermediary corporation tax shelters, an aggressive type 
may pursue the overdisclosure strategy by purposely disclosing to the IRS its participation in one of these 
transactions.  See note 245 for a description of IRS Notice 2008-111. 
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on an anticipatory angel list.  The next Subpart describes how such a disin-
centive for aggressive types might be implemented. 
B. Targeted Overdisclosure Penalties 
Overdisclosure is not just the product of uncertain features of the tax 
shelter reporting rules, but also of a significant omission from these rules.  It is 
an act for which the tax shelter reporting rules levy no explicit sanction.258 
The absence of any sanction for filing unnecessary disclosure statements 
with the IRS makes the decision to overdisclose an obvious one for both 
conservative and aggressive types.  For conservative types, when there is a 
real question over whether a clearly nonabusive transaction is reportable 
under a broad application of the rules, erring on the side of disclosure is easy.  
For aggressive types, overdisclosure is even better than costless—it could 
actually enable them to avoid potentially significant costs that would occur if 
the IRS detected their abusive tax shelters. 
By contrast, current tax law contains severe penalties for taxpayers and 
advisors that fail to disclose their participation in reportable transactions or 
that file disclosure statements missing required information.259  By failing to 
raise red flags for the IRS, taxpayers and advisors that do not disclose undermine 
the IRS’s ability to detect abusive tax planning and collect the proper amount 
of revenue.  The principle underlying the high penalties for nondisclosure, 
consequently, is to force taxpayers and advisors to internalize these costs.  As 
this Article has demonstrated, overdisclosure can be equally disruptive to the 
IRS’s detection efforts as nondisclosure by providing the IRS with so much 
information that red flags become very difficult, if not impossible, to identify.  
Despite this likely harm, the tax law contains no symmetrical monetary 
penalty for taxpayers and advisors that overdisclose. 
Because the delivery of too much irrelevant information to the IRS can 
have the same adverse consequences as the delivery of too little relevant infor-
mation, the tax law should impose monetary penalties not only for nondisclosure, 
but also for overdisclosure. 
While the IRS and the tax law have not considered the use of penalties 
for acts of overdisclosure, other institutions and bodies of law have imple-
mented such penalties.260  As the following discussion illustrates, one simple 
                                                                                                                            
 258. See I.R.C. § 6707A (containing penalties for nondisclosure, but not overdisclosure). 
 259. See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
 260. In the litigation context, for instance, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure empower 
judges to force a party to bear the attorney fees and other costs of an opposing party if it engages in 
dumptruck discovery or here-is-the-warehouse tactics.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (permitting sanctions 
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and efficient model for penalizing taxpayers and advisors that report their 
participation in nonabusive transactions is California’s recently enacted mone-
tary penalties for individuals who use the 911 emergency telephone system to 
report non-emergency events. 
1. Non-Emergency 911 Calls 
As the federal government has mandated in recent years that wireless 
telephones have access to the 911 emergency telephone system,261 local fire 
and police stations throughout the U.S. have reported a dramatic increase in 
calls to 911 that do not relate to real emergencies.262 
In California, for example, of the nearly eight million 911 calls from 
wireless telephone callers in 2007, approximately 45 percent of those calls did 
not relate to emergencies.263  Some of the non-emergency calls, California 
officials reported, were from callers with real problems, but who should have 
sought help elsewhere, such as an individual seeking assistance regarding his 
email address or a landlord asking police to serve an eviction notice.264  Other 
non-emergency calls originated with prank callers, such as individuals who 
dialed 911 to complain about late delivery of recently ordered pizza or to 
inquire about the upcoming week’s weather report.265  According to California 
officials, as a result of the increased volume, more than one third of calls can 
go unanswered during high volume times.266 
In 2008, the California legislature responded to this situation by enacting 
high penalties for individuals who use, or for parents of minors who allow the 
use of, the 911 telephone system “for any reason other than because of an emer-
gency,” which is defined as “any condition in which emergency services will 
result in the saving of a life, a reduction in the destruction of property, or 
                                                                                                                            
for failure to cooperate with discovery requests).  See infra notes 279–280 and accompanying text for 
additional examples. 
 261. See Federal Communications Commission, Wireless 911 Services, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ 
consumerfacts/wireless911srvc.html (last visited June 9, 2009) (describing 911 requirements for 
wireless telephone service providers). 
 262. See Alex Johnson, 911 Systems Choking on Non-Emergency Calls: Pranksters, Clueless Callers 
Block Lines for Legitimate Crises, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26040857 
(describing the nationwide overload of frivolous 911 calls from “pranksters” and “clueless callers”). 
 263. Id. (quoting a California Highway Patrol official). 
 264. See Bigger Penalties for Frivolous 911 Calls Signed Into Law, KESQ.com, July 12, 2008, 
http://www.kesq.com/Global/story.asp?S=8664998 [hereinafter Frivolous 911 Calls]. 
 265. See id. 
 266. See id. (“During times when call volume is high, . . . more than a third of cell phone 
calls made to the California Highway Patrol—the agency to which all such calls are initially 
routed—go unanswered, making frivolous phone calls all the more disruptive.”). 
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quicker apprehension of criminals,” among other specifically described events.267  
Under California’s new penalty structure, an individual receives an initial warn-
ing for the first non-emergency call, a $50 penalty for the second call, a $100 
penalty for the third, and a $250 penalty for all future non-emergency calls.268 
Proponents of the California legislation have argued that it will cause 
the type of individuals who have placed frivolous 911 calls in the past—
either out of ignorance or bad intent—to refrain from placing such calls after 
considering the potential penalties.269  According to the bill’s author, the new 
penalties are intended to “better deter this dangerous behavior by more 
immediately imposing significant sanctions upon illegal callers.”270 
2. Application to Tax Shelter Disclosure 
Just as frivolous 911 calls impede the ability of emergency service 
providers to deliver life-saving aid,271 overdisclosure causes IRS agents to 
spend considerable time investigating highly complex nonabusive transac-
tions rather than those involving abusive tax planning.  And just as 911 
operators receive calls from two types of individuals, the ignorant and the 
malicious, the IRS receives unnecessary disclosure from both conservative 
and aggressive types.272  In light of these similarities, the government might 
fine taxpayers or advisors that disclose nonabusive activities in the same way 
that California imposes escalating penalties for non-emergency 911 calls. 
Despite the common traits of the two types of unhelpful reporting, there 
is a significant difference that may reduce the feasibility of monetary penalties 
for overdisclosure.  Most individuals can quickly determine whether an event 
is a real emergency before placing a call to 911.  Taxpayers and advisors, on 
the other hand, may not be able to determine as easily whether a transaction 
qualifies as potentially abusive under the tax shelter reporting rules. 
This distinction begs caution in imposing fines like those for frivolous 
911 calls on taxpayers and advisors that overdisclose nonabusive activities.  
Because the IRS cannot identify an abusive tax shelter without seeing it, 
requests for information from taxpayers and advisors must contain some level 
                                                                                                                            
 267. Assemb. B. 1976, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
 268. Id.  
 269. Frivolous 911 Calls, supra note 264. 
 270. Bill Analysis, Assemb. B. 1976, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. June 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_1951-2000/ab_1976_cfa_20080611_123529_sen_floor.html. 
 271. As one 911 operator described the problem, “‘You’ve got a true emergency with somebody 
out there—that there’s a shooting or something—then those officers are not able to respond to that 
emergency call, because they’re taking care’ of callers who abuse 911. . . .”  Johnson, supra note 262. 
 272. See supra Part III. 
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of generality.  A monetary penalty for overdisclosure, especially when com-
bined with the existing high penalties for nondisclosure,273 could understandably 
increase taxpayer and advisor confusion. 
A response to this potential design obstacle could be to limit penalties 
to taxpayers and advisors that disclose the most obviously nonabusive 
transactions—those that the IRS has explicitly included on an angel list.   
Because the transactions on an angel list are nonabusive and clearly 
described, they would provide adequate advance notice of disclosure that 
could subject taxpayers and advisors to overdisclosure penalties.  As the 
previous Subpart discussed, the IRS aims to keep angel lists as specific as 
possible, to avoid creating loopholes through which taxpayers or advisors 
could avoid disclosing information that is relevant to tax shelter detection.274 
Of course, the angel lists would not alleviate all uncertainty, and a 
monetary penalty for overdisclosure should not apply if a taxpayer or advisor 
was honestly unsure whether a particular transaction was exactly like one on 
the angel list.  To deal with this situation, an exception could apply to any 
taxpayer or advisor who received a private letter ruling275 from the IRS 
allowing disclosure. 
In summary, under this proposal, any taxpayer or advisor that discloses a 
transaction included on an IRS angel list would be subject to a monetary pen-
alty for each disclosure, unless the taxpayer or advisor has sought and received 
a private letter ruling from the IRS permitting disclosure of the transaction 
at issue.  This proposed penalty for acts of overdisclosure would apply on a 
strict liability basis.  It would supplement, not replace, those penalties that 
apply under current law for acts of nondisclosure. 
3. Rationale 
The proposed penalty would better deter aggressive types from overdis-
closing than current law, would cause conservative types to increase their care 
when filing disclosure statements, and would be a more administrable approach 
to the overdisclosure response than other alternatives. 
Increased Deterrence.  While the proposed penalty would not apply to all 
forms of overdisclosure, it would increase the cost of burying information 
about an abusive tax position amid a sea of disclosure statements regarding 
                                                                                                                            
 273. See I.R.C. § 6707A (2006). 
 274. See supra notes 235–239 and accompanying text for discussion of angel lists. 
 275. A private letter ruling is a written determination from the IRS regarding the expected 
tax treatment of a particular transaction.  See Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. 1, 6 (describing 
purpose of private letter rulings). 
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specifically designated nonabusive transactions.  The aggressive hedge fund 
that continues to file disclosure statements regarding plain vanilla total return 
swaps, as a way to hide its notional principal contract tax shelter,276 would 
now face a potential monetary penalty for each instance of disclosing an 
angel list transaction.  Further, because the proposed penalty would apply 
separately to each occurrence of overdisclosure, it would be most effective 
against aggressive taxpayers and advisors.  Aggressive types may calculate the 
new potential cost of overdisclosure and determine that it is no longer a 
practical detection avoidance strategy.  As a result, the proposed penalty 
could enhance the IRS’s ability to detect and challenge abusive tax planning. 
Increased Care.  As well as deterring intentional excessive reporting of 
nonabusive transactions, the proposed penalty would cause conservative 
taxpayers and advisors to take more care in filing disclosure statements.  Just 
as California’s new penalty structure causes residents to consider whether a 
particular event is a real emergency before dialing 911, the proposed penalty 
would motivate conservative types to check an IRS angel list before disclos-
ing a particular nonabusive transaction.  The proposed penalty, thus, would 
also enhance the IRS’s detection efforts by forcing conservative taxpayers and 
advisors to internalize the cost of unreasonable caution in complying with the 
tax shelter reporting rules. 
Administrabilty.  The administrability of the proposed penalty, espe-
cially when compared with alternative penalty structures, is one of its most 
attractive attributes. 
The proposed penalty is simple.  In the same way that California’s pen-
alty applies to each non-emergency 911 call,277 the proposed penalty would 
apply to each disclosure of a nonabusive transaction contained on an IRS angel 
list.  Like California’s penalty,278 the proposed penalty applies on a strict liability 
basis, and thus does not require an inquiry into the intent of taxpayers or 
advisors filing unnecessary disclosure statements or other factual matters. 
The proposed penalty would be much easier to administer than the broad 
anti-abuse standards other areas of the law have applied in comparable 
situations.  In securities fraud cases, courts have applied the “doctrine of bur-
ied facts” where corporations have publicly disclosed material facts in a manner 
                                                                                                                            
 276. See Kosnitzky, supra note 93, at 817–18 (describing the requirement that hedge funds 
and material advisors disclose possible reportable transactions in protective filings in order to 
avoid stiff penalties). 
 277. Assemb. B. 1976, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
 278. Id. 
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that obscures their significance.279  For example, when a corporation discloses 
a director’s conflict of interest in a lengthy public filing amid unrelated text, a 
court may not find this disclosure adequate to shield the corporation from 
liability to investors.  Because the doctrine of buried facts requires heavy 
factual analysis and is “not logically susceptible to [a] bright line test,”280 it would 
be a difficult approach to apply in the context of tax shelter reporting.  The 
IRS and the courts would need to consider issues such as the number of 
nonabusive transactions a taxpayer disclosed at the same time it disclosed an 
abusive one, as well as the content of the disclosure statements, before 
determining whether disclosure of the abusive transaction should be disregarded 
for purposes of the nondisclosure penalties.  The proposed penalty negates the 
need for any similarly fact-intensive inquiries. 
Advantages Over “Self-Adjusting Penalty.”  The proposed penalty is also a 
more appropriate approach to overdisclosure than Raskolnikov’s “self-adjust-
ing penalty.”281  As an illustration of Raskolnikov’s penalty structure, a taxpayer 
that reports an illegitimate charitable deduction on the same line on its tax 
return as a large number of legitimate charitable deductions would be subject 
to a monetary penalty that is based not on the value of the fraudulent 
deduction, but rather on the value of the legitimate deductions.282  Raskol-
nikov’s penalty applies only when a taxpayer has claimed both a legitimate 
and an illegitimate tax benefit.283 
As this Article has demonstrated,284 however, disclosure statements that 
describe solely nonabusive transactions can still weaken the IRS’s ability to 
detect abuse.  When an overly cautious taxpayer discloses a transaction that is 
plain vanilla yet complex, IRS agents may spend significant time and resources 
reviewing the details of the transaction.  If we attempted to apply Raskolnikov’s 
self-adjusting penalty in this scenario, it would not apply to the conservative 
taxpayer since he has only disclosed information to the IRS regarding 
nonabusive transactions. 
                                                                                                                            
 279. See, e.g., Gould v. Am.-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3rd Cir. 1976) 
(disclosure of material facts in footnotes and appendices considered nondisclosure); Kohn v. Am. 
Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 290–91 (3rd Cir. 1972) (material facts cannot be “buried” in 
explanatory materials). 
 280. TCG Sec., Inc. v. S. Union Co., No. 11282, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 12, at *18 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 31, 1990) (“Whether information is ‘buried’ is the type of determination not logically susceptible 
to the bright line test that [plaintiff] attempts to create.”). 
 281. Raskolnikov, supra note 13. 
 282. Id. at 572. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See supra Part II.C. 
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The proposed overdisclosure penalty could apply to this scenario.  It 
applies to any disclosure of a nonabusive transaction on an IRS angel list, on 
a strict liability basis, regardless of the other types of transactions that a 
taxpayer has disclosed.  So in this context, the proposal has a much broader 
reach than Raskolnikov’s self-adjusting penalty. 
4. Potential Objections 
Likely objections to penalizing overdisclosure are that it could result in 
time-consuming penalty disputes between taxpayers and the IRS, send mixed 
signals to taxpayers and advisors regarding what they are required to disclose, and 
shift the current overdisclosure response to a different medium.  Structural fea-
tures of the proposed penalty, however, should adequately address these concerns. 
Penalty Disputes.  The first likely objection to a monetary penalty for 
overdisclosure is that it could encourage litigation over the penalty.  Such 
disputes, opponents might argue, would distract the IRS from focusing on 
details of the underlying abusive transactions.  Daniel Shaviro has written 
that monetary penalties for taxpayers that disclose too much unhelpful 
information would “prove too much of a distracting and costly detour from 
litigating issues of substance.”285 
While this may be a valid criticism of a penalty for any disclosure of 
transactions that ultimately are not abusive tax shelters, it is much less com-
pelling in the case of the proposed penalty.  Because the proposed penalty 
applies only to taxpayers and advisors that disclose transactions precisely 
contained on IRS angel lists, disputes over whether the penalty applies 
should be minimal. 
Mixed Signals.  Another potential criticism is that the combination of pen-
alties for failure to disclose, and penalties for overdisclosure, may leave taxpayers 
and advisors scratching their heads in uncertainty over what information 
they are required to disclose to the IRS. 
Again, the structure of the proposed penalty should alleviate this con-
cern.  If the proposed penalty were implemented, taxpayers and advisors 
would err on the side of disclosure, as they are instructed to do under current 
law.  Before filing a disclosure statement they would simply need to confirm 
that it does not relate to a transaction explicitly exempted from disclosure by 
an angel list.  The anticipatory angel lists proposed above should, thus, reduce 
potential taxpayer and advisor uncertainty. 
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Shifted Overdisclosure.  The last likely objection to the proposed penalty 
is that it would merely shift the overdisclosure response to a different medium.  
Opponents might argue that the exception from the proposed penalty, for 
disclosures covered by a private letter ruling, may simply cause taxpayers and 
advisors to flood the IRS with requests for private letter rulings. 
This objection is misguided because it ignores important features of the 
private letter ruling process.  First, private letter ruling requests involve consid-
erable transaction costs, including the fees charged by the IRS and, more 
significantly, by counsel, and expenses related to the taxpayer’s back-and-forth 
discussions with the IRS.286  It is unlikely that aggressive taxpayers would 
ignore the potentially onerous costs of requesting private letter rulings for a 
mere attempt to distract the IRS from their abusive tax strategies.  Second, 
requests for private letter rulings are not addressed by the Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis.287  As such, it is unlikely that excessive private letter ruling requests 
would interfere with the detection efforts of the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis. 
C. Non-Tax Documentation 
The last proposal I offer to reduce overdisclosure is a reconsideration of 
the type of information that taxpayers are required to disclose to the IRS. 
The IRS currently mandates that taxpayers filing reportable transaction 
disclosure statements also provide written descriptions of the disclosed transac-
tions.288  An inherent weakness in this disclosure model is that the content of 
this description is in the total control of the taxpayer.  Conservative types may 
submit pages of detailed and thorough discussion in order to convince the IRS 
that their disclosed transactions are not abusive, while aggressive types may 
do the same in order to obfuscate the true tax avoidance purpose of their 
transactions.  The length and complexity of these submissions may slow the 
IRS’s detection capability.289 
A contrasting disclosure model could require taxpayers to provide the 
IRS with non-tax documentation, such as written descriptions of the transac-
tion that the taxpayer prepared for actors other than the IRS. 
The IRS has implemented this approach in other contexts, such as pri-
vate letter ruling requests.  When a taxpayer requests a private letter ruling, 
                                                                                                                            
 286. See Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. 1, 16–28, 68 (describing requirements for private 
letter ruling request, including payment of $11,500 user fee). 
 287. See id. at 6. 
 288. I.R.S. Form 8886, l. 7b, supra note 120; see also Instructions for I.R.S. Form 8886, supra 
note 112, at 6 (“Describe each step of the transaction including all information known to you.”). 
 289. See supra notes 120–127 and accompanying text. 
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the IRS requires a detailed description of the transaction and the taxpayer’s 
opinion of how the tax law should apply to it.290  For some transactions, the 
IRS also requires copies of particular documents the taxpayer wrote for pur-
poses other than tax compliance, such as descriptions of the transaction prepared 
for its board of directors.291  The IRS reviews the non-tax documentation to 
confirm that the taxpayer has not misrepresented the true motivation underlying 
its transaction.292 
The non-tax documentation approach could be incorporated into the tax 
shelter reporting rules, though its scope would need to be limited in the interest 
of administrability.  Since individual taxpayers may not regularly prepare written 
descriptions of their transactions for non-tax-related purposes, it may be 
unproductive to apply this requirement to them.  Business taxpayers, such as 
corporations and partnerships, are the type of taxpayers most likely to produce 
and maintain non-tax documentation.  And because the goal of this model is 
to equip the IRS with transaction descriptions written for a non-tax audience, 
this disclosure requirement should not apply to documents written for internal 
tax-compliance staff. 
One practical formulation of this approach would be a requirement that 
when a corporation or partnership files a reportable transaction disclosure 
statement with the IRS, it must also attach any written description of the 
transaction that the taxpayer prepared for its chief executive officer, board of 
directors, shareholders, or partners, prior to filing the disclosure statement. 
1. Rationale 
The non-tax documentation approach could provide the IRS with an 
important sorting mechanism that would enhance its ability to detect abuse, 
dissuade business taxpayers from filing unnecessary disclosure statements, and 
would be difficult for business taxpayers to avoid. 
                                                                                                                            
 290. See Rev. Proc. 2008-1, 2008-1 I.R.B. 1, 16-28 for detailed discussion of procedures 
related to taxpayer submission of private letter ruling requests. 
 291. The IRS applies this requirement when taxpayers request private letter rulings regarding 
the applicability of Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that enables a corporation 
and its shareholders to avoid current tax liability on the distribution of stock of a controlled subsidiary.  
See Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-1 C.B. 696. 
 292. For example, a corporate taxpayer may represent in its written submission to the IRS 
that it will not have any continuing relationship with a subsidiary corporation from which it plans 
to separate in a tax-deferred “spin-off” transaction (a requirement under the tax law), but it may have 
described the extent of the relationship differently in a written summary for the board of directors. 
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Sorting Mechanism.  A central rationale of this proposal is that, at least 
with respect to business taxpayers, it could better enable the IRS to sort 
transactions that deserve continued examination from those that do not. 
Non-tax documentation could equip the IRS with descriptions of the 
disclosed transactions that are more clear and concise than the written 
descriptions prepared especially for the IRS.  Average board members and 
chief executive officers are unlikely to be fluent in the language of tax law.  
They are also busy people who must digest significant amounts of written 
information daily.  When a tax director explains a transaction in a memoran-
dum for a large corporation’s chief executive officer, she may provide a bullet 
point discussion in layman’s terms of the purpose and potential tax conse-
quences of the transaction.  The clarity and brevity of non-tax documentation 
may enable the IRS to distinguish more quickly an ordinary business transaction 
from an abusive tax avoidance strategy. 
It is also possible that non-tax documentation could provide the IRS 
with a more thorough explanation of how the taxpayer originally learned of 
the disclosed transaction.  Correspondence between a tax director and senior 
management may explain a relationship with an advisor in more detail than 
the current reportable transaction disclosure statement.293  If such correspon-
dence reveals the participation of a known tax shelter promoter, the IRS 
would immediately flag the disclosed transaction for further review. 
Overdisclosure Friction.  Another benefit of this proposal is that it could 
cause some tax directors to pause before disclosing transactions that are 
clearly outside of the scope of the reportable transaction categories.  Tax 
directors could perceive the submission of board presentations or written 
communications to the chief executive officer regarding a nonabusive transac-
tion as risking unnecessary scrutiny by IRS agents.  Increased exposure to 
inquiry by the IRS could especially discourage conservative tax directors from 
filing unnecessary disclosure statements.  A non-tax documentation requirement, 
thus, could curb the tendency of some taxpayers to view overdisclosure as the 
default response. 
Difficult to Avoid.  An attractive feature of the proposal is that it may be 
difficult for business taxpayers to avoid creating a paper trail regarding tax 
strategies they eventually must disclose to the IRS.  The IRS often designates 
specific transactions as subject to mandatory disclosure after significant numbers 
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of taxpayers have used them to claim tax benefits.294  The consequence of 
retroactive disclosure requirements is that a written presentation regarding a now 
reportable transaction may have been prepared before the IRS designated the 
transaction as one that must be disclosed.  If the IRS subsequently designated it 
as a listed transaction or a transaction of interest, the business taxpayer would 
have to attach copies of the presentation to its reportable transaction disclosure 
statement.  Deliberate noncompliance or fraud would be the only ways this 
business taxpayer could avoid the non-tax documentation requirement.   
2. Potential Objections 
Opponents of the non-tax documentation approach would likely argue 
that it would increase the IRS’s administrative burden, suffer from noncompli-
ance, and force business taxpayers to provide the IRS with legally privileged 
information.  Each of these arguments is considered below. 
Increased Administrative Burden.  A probable objection to the non-tax 
documentation requirement is that it could bury the Office of Tax Shelter 
Analysis in additional paper, extending the amount of time it takes for IRS 
agents to identify disclosure statements that reveal questionable transactions. 
This objection overlooks unique ways in which the IRS could utilize the 
non-tax documents, compared to what it currently receives.  The IRS could 
specifically search for deviations between a business taxpayer’s description of a 
transaction in its disclosure statement and its characterization of the same trans-
action to its chief executive officer or board of directors.  One team of IRS 
agents could review business taxpayers’ written submissions in their disclosure 
statements and a different team could review non-tax documentation.  The 
two teams could compare notes and identify inconsistencies.  Strong deviations 
may prompt the IRS to give a disclosed reportable transaction further review. 
If the non-tax documentation requirement created an administrative bur-
den on the IRS, or business taxpayers, its scope could be narrowed.  For example, 
the proposal could apply to non-tax documents produced during a fixed time 
period, such as one to two years prior to the business taxpayer’s submission of its 
disclosure statement.  Another modification could restrict the requirement to 
business taxpayers with net assets in excess of a set threshold. 
High Noncompliance Risk.  Another likely objection is that business tax-
payers could respond to the new requirement by filing disclosure statements 
that omit incriminating documents, or by simply failing to disclose any addi-
tional documents at all. 
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Such noncompliance concerns, however, neglect key incentives that 
business taxpayers may have to file non-tax documentation with the IRS.  
Failure to file the required non-tax documentation would incur high mone-
tary and other penalties under existing law.295  Just as high monetary penalties 
for nondisclosure have encouraged business taxpayers to increase their filing 
of disclosure statements,296 such penalties should also create a powerful incen-
tive for business taxpayers to attach non-tax documentation.  Further, 
conservative tax directors may comply out of fear that a reportable transaction 
disclosure statement containing minimal non-tax documentation could raise a 
new red flag for the IRS and, consequently, invite unwelcome audit attention. 
Privileged Information.  Opponents of this proposal could also argue that 
it would force business taxpayers to submit documents that are legally privi-
leged under the attorney-client privilege, statutory confidentiality protections,297 
or the work product doctrine. 
Although such privilege claims have salience in other contexts,298 they 
should be significantly less relevant if the IRS were to implement the non-tax 
documentation proposal.  First, because the proposal would apply to documen-
tation prepared solely by the taxpayer, neither the attorney-client privilege 
nor the statutory confidentiality protections for advice from authorized tax 
practitioners299 should apply.  Second, the work product doctrine only applies 
to documents that were prepared “in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”300  
While some courts have held that taxpayers may prepare tax accrual work 
papers in anticipation of litigation,301 this proposal targets documents that 
business taxpayers prepare for a different purpose: to seek necessary approval 
to engage in a particular transaction.  It is unlikely, therefore, that business 
taxpayers could argue successfully that they prepared these documents as a 
result of a “substantial threat”302 of litigation. 
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This Article has argued that the government should not only deter 
nondisclosure of information required by the tax shelter reporting rules, but 
should strive to prevent overdisclosure of information as well.  Congress acted 
appropriately in 2004 by enacting severe penalties for taxpayers and advisors 
who simply turn their backs on the obligation to disclose reportable transac-
tions.  But by ignoring the potential for overdisclosure, the government has 
allowed proverbial haystacks of unnecessary disclosure statements to accumulate 
and shield tax shelter needles from view. 
The tax law, as this Article has demonstrated, offers multiple incentives 
for conservative and aggressive taxpayers and advisors to embrace overdisclo-
sure.  Conservative types, who exhibit caution and prudence as core attributes, 
respond to broad and uncertain reporting requirements by erring on the side of 
disclosure rather than risk any chance of high nondisclosure penalties.  And 
aggressive types, who rationally consider expected benefits and costs of risky tax 
positions, view excessive disclosure as a perfectly legal way to escape the high 
nondisclosure penalties while obscuring their use of abusive tax strategies. 
As an alternative to the government’s wait-and-see approach to overdis-
closure, this Article has offered three proposals that could be implemented as 
an overall preemptive strategy.  First, to prevent disclosure of clearly nonabusive 
activities, the IRS should include them on anticipatory angel lists when 
designating new listed transactions.  Next, as a means of explicitly deterring 
the overdisclosure response, Congress should enact targeted monetary penalties 
for taxpayers and advisors who report participation in any transaction on an 
IRS angel list.  Last, to enhance the IRS’s ability to sort abusive transactions 
from nonabusive ones and to discourage overdisclosure, the IRS should require 
business taxpayers to submit copies of non-tax documentation when filing 
reportable transaction disclosure statements. 
While some have praised the mandatory disclosure regime for winning 
the war on tax shelters,303 too much information can have the same value as 
too little.  Unless the government recognizes this reality and reacts accordingly, 
the tax shelter victory may prove to be short-lived. 
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